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CROWDFUNDING CAPITAL IN THE AGE OF 
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TOKENS 
PATRICIA H. LEE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Less than three years ago, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) adopted investment crowdfunding 
regulations (“Reg. CF”) to facilitate small companies’ efforts to 
raise capital and jumpstart employment.1  Reg. CF provides 
companies2  with potentially one of the most disruptive 
transformations in capital markets.3  Its potential has been 
lauded as a possible vehicle to democratize capital formation and 
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Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, and B.A., Northwestern University Weinberg 
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30 company. Additionally, the author wishes to thank Saint Louis University School 
of Law, Dean William Johnson and Associate Deans Marcia McCormick and Anders 
Walker for the generous support which made this research work possible; Special 
thanks to Professors Karen Petroski, Constance Wagner, Yvette Liebesman, 
Matthew Bodie, Miriam Cherry, Monica Eppinger, Michael Korybut, Carol 
Needham, Sidney Watson, Ana Santos-Rothman, Spencer Waller and the Law 
Library Faculty and staff, Lynn Hartke and David Kullman; Professor Joan 
Heminway and the 2018 Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) Business 
Law panel and discussion group; Professor Mae Quinn and the law faculty research 
and writing retreat held in Magnolia; Anonymous peer review readers; Research 
faculty fellows: Edward Theobald, Shannon Rempe, Crystal Lewis; Summer Fellow, 
Joshua Swyers; St. John’s Law Review members Victoria Harris, Sean Kelly, 
Michael Bloom, and Kristen Tierney; and my family and friends who have provided 
continuous support throughout my research. 
1 See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, et al. (2018) [hereinafter SEC 
Crowdfunding Act]; adopted pursuant to the Jumpstart Our Business Companies 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, Title III, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) [hereinafter 
JOBS Act]. 
2 The term “company” represents small companies that provide notice filings 
under Reg. CF, notwithstanding the actual entity classification, e.g. limited liability 
company or partnership. 
3 William Hinman, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, Remarks at 
the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto: Digital Asset Transactions: When 
Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018) (“Some people believe that this technology 
will transform e-commerce as we know it.”); Christine Hurt, Pricing 
Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOS, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
217, 220 (2015). See also Howard Marks, How Crowdfunding is Disrupting VCs, 
FORBES (June 10, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/ 
06/10/how-crowdfunding-is-disrupting-vcs/#4a105f174823. 
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to decentralize investments by way of the Internet.4  This method 
of companies crowdfunding securities through intermediaries 
(“broker dealers” or “funding portals”) and offering the securities 
for sale to the general public is referred to as “investment 
crowdfunding.”5 
Scholars have raised numerous questions about the 
companies, the investments, and the costs of offerings before and 
after adoption of Reg. CF.6  Various questions and concerns 
raised include whether: (1) companies would refrain from using 
this newly crafted exemption in light of the regulatory complexity 
 
4 Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1065–
66 (2016) (recommending a resale exemption to avoid subjecting small stockholders 
to the risk of fraud-on-the-market and to limit disclosure requirements). See also 
Lenore Palladino, Democratizing Investment (May 15, 2018) (unpublished paper) (on 
file with Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt Insitute, Smith College), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194693# (arguing that “[i]f 
portals act as connectors rather than thick intermediaries, small investors could, in 
theory, gain more of the wealth flowing from private companies”). 
5 Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (last updated Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/small 
bus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#_ftn1. In order to act as an intermediary in 
a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities in reliance on § 4(a)(6) of the 
Securities Act, an organization is required to register—either as a broker-dealer 
under § 15(b) of the Exchange Act or as a funding portal pursuant to § 4A(a)(1) of 
the Securities Act. These funding portals can register with the SEC on Form 
Funding Portal and can be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, limited 
liability company, or other organized entity acting as an intermediary in 
crowdfunding transactions. Id. The funding portal must also become a member of 
FINRA. See Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/ 
funding-portals-we-regulate (last visited Feb. 26, 2019); see also Forms List, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/forms (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) 
(additional information for registration, amendments, and withdrawal are set out in 
Instructions for Forms, available at http://www.sec.gov/forms and in text of the 
rules). 
6 Reza Dibadj, Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 27–29, 39 
(2015) (arguing that crowdfunding at these costs is a “dismal idea”). See also Jack 
Wroldsen, Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 551 
(2017) (discussing inherent risks of crowdfunding investments, including “inherent 
uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-stage start-up companies,” 
sophistication of ordinary investors; and fraud running rampant); Lynnise E. 
Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the Startup 
Ecosystem, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 447 (2018) (“[C]urrent capital raising schemes 
available to entrepreneurs may not be enough to meaningfully narrow the racial 
wealth divide . . . .”); David Groshoff, Equity Crowdfunding as Economic 
Development?, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 317, 337 (2016) (the SEC’s inability to protect 
investors from investment fraud); Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All 
Regulated but Not Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359, 362 (2015) (concerns 
about fraud and incompetence). 
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and exorbitant costs;7 (2) the investment offering quality would 
jeopardize the offerings or keep investors away; (3) investors 
would fall prey to purchasing inappropriate securities;8 (4) Reg. 
CF might become the “go to” exemption for companies with poor 
credit ratings;9 and, (5) alternative financing would render Reg. 
CF of little effect.10  Before the regulations were adopted, 
Christine Hurt further asked the question: “which types of 
entrepreneurs and funding models will survive and thrive under 
a new crowdfunding regime?”11 
As the lion’s share of securities offered are under public 
offerings or other safe harbor exemptions, the outcomes and 
impacts of Reg. CF small business offerings are not studied, 
monitored or amplified to the same extent as larger offerings.  
The line of inquiry in this Article is the scope of Reg. CF, 
including questions about the level of company participation, 
the types of businesses seeking capital formation, and the quality 
of the investments offered.  Furthermore, to what extent has Reg. 
CF investment crowdfunding facilitated company capital 
formation and provided a means for investors to purchase 
suitable investments?  Towards that end, the author retrieved 
data from SEC Form C notice filings and other SEC filings 
completed by companies beginning with Reg. CF’s adoption date 
through June 30, 2018.12  Additionally, company websites were 
 
7 Dibadj argues that offerings in excess of $500,000 were less discouraging, and 
predicts that “crowdfunding will have precious little impact.” Dibadj, supra note 6, 
at 41. See also Patricia H. Lee, Access to Capital or Just More Blues? Issuer Decision-
making Post SEC Crowdfunding Regulation, 18 TENN. J. BUS. L. 19, 68–69 (2016) 
(suggesting that high regulatory costs, liability and public disclosure compliance 
requirements may deter some companies from seeking capital through Reg. CF 
financing methods). 
8 Dibadj, supra note 6, at 40–41. 
9 Lee, supra note 7, at 70. 
10 Id. at 64–67. 
11 Hurt, supra note 3, at 221. 
12 Edgar Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (company Form 
C, C/A, C-U, C-W filings and registrations were retrieved and reviewed here); Form 
C, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/formc.pdf, (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). With respect to company Reg. CF offerings: Form C/A is the method to 
amend an offering; Form C-U is the filing to announce the success or failure of an 
offering after the closing date; Form C-W is the form to withdraw the filing before 
the closing date. These forms encompassed the dataset utilized. See also Constance 
Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace: Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924 (2001) (explaining that the SEC has 
allowed Edgar Filings since 1984 to permit companies to electronically file disclosure 
documents under the 1933, 1934 Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
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reviewed to compare and contrast the data filed with the SEC, 
primarily for updates. 
Two clarifications about the usage of the term “investment 
crowdfunding” should be noted.  First, scholars refer to this type 
of financing method in several other ways: equity crowdfunding,13 
securities crowdfunding,14 investor crowdfunding,15 and securities 
crowdsourcing.16  As the focus of this Article is on both a 
company’s attempt to formulate capital and the suitability of 
securities for investors, the term investment crowdfunding seems 
most appropriate in this context.  Second, investment 
crowdfunding could also be used to refer to crowdfunding 
campaigns that are offered under other 1933 Act exemptions or 
to international campaigns.17  In this Article, the term 
investment crowdfunding is primarily used to discuss Reg. CF 
exemption campaigns hosted in the United States. 
In light of the research, the Article makes several assertions.  
First, the progress of investment crowdfunding is neither dismal, 
nor a resounding success. Rather, the change is more a mix of 
positive and troubling developments.  The data reviewed and 
retrieved provides positives regarding participation, funding 
portal expansion, and the fact that some companies raised 
capital.  Furthermore, there has been growth in the 
 
13 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier, 70 
OKLA. L. REV. 189, 194 (2017). However, Professor Heminway further points out 
“that, not every crowdfunded offering of a profit-sharing instrument or interest is 
equity crowdfunding.” Id. at 194. See also Gabison, supra note 6, at 362 (equity 
crowdfunding); Groshoff, supra note 6, at 334. 
14 Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 885, 889 (2018). The terminology “securities crowdfunding” is a good descriptor, 
except that the term, gives focus to the securities and not the whole transaction, 
which conceivably is an investment from a shareholder’s perspective. The use of the 
term “equity crowdfunding” appears limiting as companies can seek debt, 
convertible or equity financing. The opposite concern surrounds using the term 
“securities crowdsourcing,” which implies a broader context but is narrowed by 
putting “securities” in front of the broader term crowdsourcing. 
15 Hurt, supra note 3, at 234 (“Both equity crowdfunding and debt crowdfunding 
with an expectation of interest offer a return on a backer’s investment above and 
beyond a thank you card or DVD . . . .”). 
16 Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for 
Labor, Rewards, and Securities, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 47 (2015). 
17 See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in 
the United States, has become a worldwide phenomenon, with New Zealand leading 
the charge.”); Anton Didenko, Regulating FinTech: Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN 
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 311, 313 (2018) (discussing crowdfunding in Kenya and South 
Africa); KIM WALES, PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A GUIDE 
TO THE NEW CAPITAL MARKETS FOR JOB CREATORS, INVESTORS, AND 
ENTREPRENEURS 218 ( 2018). 
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crowdfunding of Reg. CF securities, and in the sale of digital 
tokens based on blockchain technology (also known as 
“distributed ledger technology,” or “DLT”).18 
At the same time, the Article notes some troubling inferences 
about investment crowdfunding company offerings generally, and 
digital token offerings, more specifically.  For example, the 
expansion of securities (i.e. digital tokens and coins) offered to 
investors may present risks for both investors and the 
companies.19  Reg. CF digital token offerings reliant on the 
blockchain are complex, uncertain, and speculative securities, 
which raise doubts about the likelihood of an investor’s return on 
an investment.  Some companies have not been successful with 
their digital token offerings, with cancelled offerings rather than 
capital raised.  Although funding portals are growing, the 
downside is that funding portals are typically located in limited 
parts of the country and have limited liability.  Many areas of the 
country are not participating in Reg. CF capital formation.  Thus, 
unless a company in such an area utilizes an alternative means 
of financing, they may not have access to capital for their 
emerging enterprise.  The foregoing suggests that we are not yet 
close to fulfilling the goals of capital formation, let alone job 
creation under the current regulatory scheme. 
Insights from the research suggest that this topic is more 
nuanced than initially apparent, because the larger market of 
initial coin offerings (“ICO”) is represented by well-publicized 
ICOs which have the greatest volume of transactions when 
compared to Reg. CF digital tokens.20  That being said, ICOs are 
being closely monitored by the SEC, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”).21  However, Reg. CF blockchain-based 
offerings are not monitored in the same way since companies file 
the required and periodic notices with the SEC including 
 
18 See KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF 
TRUST 49 (2018) (“Cryptocurrency enthusiasts envision digital tokens as being 
widely accepted for all sorts of financial payments by people around the world, as 
credit cards are.”). See also, Jay G. Baris & Joshua Ashley Klayman, Blockchain 
Basics for Investment Managers: A Token of Appreciation, 51 REV. SEC. AND 
COMMODITIES REG. 67, 68 (2018). 
19 See infra Part I.C. 
20 See infra Part I.A. 
21 See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial 
Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS 
L.J. 463, 465 (2019) (“[T]he Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions have turned their attention to token sales.”). 
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disclosure documents that include the predictions of risk 
affiliated with the offerings. 
To illustrate the findings, this Article proceeds like so.  Part 
I provides a brief history of the Reg. CF exemption law and the 
research findings about investment crowdfunding, generally, and 
digital tokens, more specifically.  Next, Part II provides insights 
on the current state of offering blockchain-based digital tokens to 
unsophisticated investors and the silver linings in the data.  
Finally, Part III provides recommendations for a path forward in 
Reg. CF.  First, the SEC should re-evaluate its regulatory policy 
in light of the proliferation of blockchain-based token offerings 
and gaps in funding portals, and provide additional warnings to 
unsophisticated investors who may be taking on enhanced 
investment risk.  The uncertainty and risk of digital tokens 
reliant on blockchain technology foretells a troubling high risk of 
investment loss, which may supplement the expected high risk of 
loss for startup tech companiees.  Second, companies, 
particularly idealistic tech startups, that are considering the 
offer of digital tokens, should thoughtfully consider alternatives 
to these offerings.  There remains a level of uncertainty and risk 
in these offerings, which could result in greater risk and liability 
than the alternative financing available to them.  Lastly, 
economic development organizations should consider developing 
their role in attracting, designing, and implementing funding 
portals to provide the support that tech and other startup 
companies need to raise capital for their business. 
I. REG. CF LAW AND DIGITAL TOKENS 
A. Capital Formation 
Historically, raising capital was a pathway for large, well-
established enterprises.  One way larger enterprises raised large 
amounts of capital was through traditional public offerings of 
securities under the 1933 Act.  Prior to Reg. CF, companies that 
sought to offer securities had several options.  First, they could 
register securities pursuant to the 1933 Act, which provides a 
statutory framework for the federal regulation of securities 
offerings.  Registration would be cost prohibitive for smaller 
companies.22  Second, companies could seek one of several safe 
harbor exemptions discussed further in this Section.  The other 
 
22 See Lee, supra note 7, at 67. 
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traditional way of raising capital is pursuant to various 
exemptions under the 1933 Act, discused herein.  Third, the 
company could avoid offering securities and consider a host of 
other funding alternatives.23 
“Crowdfunding is the use of the Internet or other means to 
raise money . . . in small amounts from a large number of 
contributors to support a wide range of ideas and ventures.”24  
Investment crowdfunding is the younger sibling of the 
crowdfunding of ideas, goods, and services offered to the public.  
Investment crowdfunding started with Title III of the Crowdfund 
Act.  This Act amended the 1933 Act and allowed companies25 to 
offer and sell up to $1 million of unregistered equity securities in 
a twelve-month period, without registering them.26  The SEC 
raised the cap on exempted transactions to allow companies to 
raise $1.07 million in 2017.27  The normative goal of the 
Crowdfund Act was to encourage small business growth and 
promote employment, specifically to “help entrepreneurs raise 
the capital they need to put Americans back to work and create 
an economy that’s built to last.”28  The Crowdfund Act aimed to 
lower regulatory hurdles for companies trying to go public and 
to allow firms to have more private shareholders.29  The 
Crowdfund Act further promised to provide issuers the ability to 
 
23 See generally WALES, supra note 17; see also Lee, supra note 7, at 50–66. 
24 RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW AND 
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 799 (Cengage, 13th ed., 2017); see also Jason W. Parsont, 
Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 
(2014) (describing crowdfunding as a “financing method used primarily by startups 
and small businesses to raise small amounts of capital from a large number of 
people over the Internet”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the 
Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 n.1 
(2014). 
25  The Crowdfund Act would allow eligible, domestic, nonpublic issuers to raise 
up to $1.07 million as of 2017 (a figure that would be periodically adjusted for 
inflation). Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding Investment Limits Increase, U.S. SEC. 
AND EXCH. COMM’N (May 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-
bulletins/ib_crowdfundingincrease. 
26 JOBS Act, supra note 1, § 302. 
27 In the first year, the SEC capped the investments at $1 million and raised the 
cap to $1.07 million in 2017. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2018). 
28 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama 
to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Companies (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-
sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act); see also Oranburg, supra note 4, at 
1030 (discussing the goals of the Crowdfund Act). 
29 Regulation A+ (REG A+), NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/regulation-a (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
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access investors via the Internet with the aid of funding portals.  
Schwartz described the goals as a quest for efficiency, on the one 
hand, and a quest for inclusiveness on the other.30 
Registering securities or offering securities under a safe 
harbor exemption would be necessary to avoid violating § 5 of the 
1933 Act.31  Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 1933 Act generally 
prohibit any person, including broker-dealers, from using the 
mails or interstate means to sell or offer to sell, either directly or 
indirectly, any security unless a registration statement is in 
effect or has been filed with the Commission as to the offer and 
sale of such security, or an exemption from the registration 
provisions applies.32  For this reason, companies seeking to avoid 
complications under the securities laws must register or find an 
allowable safe harbor exemption.  The next Section provides a 
brief overview of the SEC’s adoption of Reg. CF and the 
differences between the legal and economic requirements of Reg. 
CF filings and other 1933 Act safe harbor exemptions.33 
1. What is Reg. CF? 
The idea of offering securities in small amounts to a large 
number of participants is not only novel, but is also becoming a 
disruptive financial and technological innovation.  This 
disruption is precipitated, in part, by the SEC’s implementation 
of the Crowdfund Act and, in part, due to a variety of external 
factors.  In a very nascent way, Reg. CF was a positive step 
towards democratizing investment markets and decentralizing 
access to capital.34  In light of the intersection of e-commerce and 
 
30 See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 893. 
31 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); Responses to Frequently 
Asked Questions About a Broker-Dealer’s Duties When Relying on the Securities Act 
Section 4(a)(4) Exemption to Execute Customer Orders, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-broker-dealer-duty-
section4.htm (“Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all offers and sales of 
securities in interstate commerce to be registered, unless an exemption from 
registration is available.”). For cases establishing a prima facia case, see SEC v. 
Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 121 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006), SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1215 
(11th Cir. 2004), SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). 
32 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a),(c). 
33 This research does not include a discussion on intrastate offerings of 
securities. 
34 Society’s ability to democratize and to decentralize access to capital is a 
question that scholars will research in the upcoming years. 
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social media, scholars have considered such crowdfunding moves 
to represent “populist, Internet-based business finance.”35 
Reg. CF  allows small, undercapitalized companies to engage 
in crowdfunding capital formation.  To that end, Reg. CF set 
forth structures, compliance requirements, restrictions, 
responsibilities, and costs, to allow for smaller equity 
investments.  Reg. CF facilitates the raising of capital from the 
general public through the sale of securities,36 provides 
opportunities for companies37 to utilize internet funding portals, 
and helps to locate members of the public willing to invest.38  The 
Crowdfund Act and the Reg. CF exemption brought the promise 
of “a new, unregistered, wide-reaching brand of securities 
offering . . . that, together with other changes in U.S. securities 
regulation, may become a new gateway to public securities 
markets.”39 
Through Reg. CF, U.S. companies that are not already 
Exchange Act reporting companies are allowed to raise up to 
$1.07 million in a twelve-month period, allow the solicitation of 
their shares, and exempt the offering from SEC and state 
securities law registration.40  Such measures have joined a host of 
other developments that have collectively opened the floodgates 
of crowdfunding investment.  For example, Congress has allowed 
companies to raise money and offer shares to the general public, 
not just to accredited or sophisticated investors. 
In addition to Reg. CF, Congress also enacted Reg. A+ in the 
JOBS Act.41  In furtherance of legislative goals, Reg. CF, Reg. A, 
and the amended Reg. A+, provided new opportunities for small 
 
35 See Heminway, supra note 13, at 193; see also Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon 
Walker, The Global Significance of Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding 
Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 347, 357, 
366 (2016) (“The rise of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—websites 
generally associated with the emergence of Web 2.0—as well as the popular payment 
services site PayPal, enabled crowdfunding to gain greater visibility.”). 
36 See, e.g.,17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2018); Parsont, supra note 24, at 282. 
37 Of the 1,112 companies that filed Form C’s to register securities, four had 
principal offices outside of the United States and those locations included: Armenia, 
Spain, Kenya and the United Kingdom. See infra Part I.C and accompanying data. 
38 See infra Part I.C. 
39 See Heminway, supra note 13, at 205; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2013) (“Securities 
crowdfunding is a new idea, modeled on the recently introduced and highly 
successful concept of ‘reward’ crowdfunding, which is practiced on Kickstarter, 
IndieGoGo, and other websites.”). 
40 Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 5. 
41 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018) (explaining the scope of the exemption). 
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businesses to attract the financing they needed to run their 
businesses.42  The basic details about each regulation are briefly 
set forth below.  Under the regulatory regimes, the definition of 
“security” is based on the broadly worded provision of § 2(a)(1) of 
the 1933 Act, which states: 
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based 
swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, 
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of 
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest 
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any 
interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or any 
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.43 
Effective June 2015, the SEC amended Reg. A and 
authorized Reg. A+ to allow a U.S. or Canadian company two 
types of greater funding opportunities, set forth as either Tier 
1 or Tier 2 offerings.44  For Tier 1 offerings, companies can 
raise up to $20 million in a twelve-month period, with no more 
than $6 million in offers by selling to security-holders that are 
affiliates.45  For Tier 2, companies are allowed to raise up to 
$50 million in a twelve-month period using a public 
solicitation of their shares, with no more than $15 million to 
affiliates, and to exempt the offering from SEC and state 
securities law registration.46 
There are also basic requirements applicable to both Tier 1 
and Tier 2 offerings, including, among others, company eligibility 
requirements, bad actor disqualification provisions, and 
disclosure requirements.  Additional requirements apply to Tier 
 
42 Anzhela Knyazeva, Regulation A+: What Do We Know So Far?, 2–7 (Nov. 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf. 
43 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
44 See Knyazeva, supra note 42, at 1–3 (Regulation A, amended June 19, 2015, 
provides an exemption from registration for certain small issues). 
45 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1). 
46 See id. § 230.251(a)(2); see also Knyazeva, supra note 42, at 3 n.10. 
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2 offerings, including limitations on the amount of money a non-
accredited investor may invest in a Tier 2 offering, requirements 
for audited financial statements, and the filing of ongoing 
reports.47  Issuers of Tier 2 offerings are not required to register 
or qualify their offerings with state securities regulators.  
However, “resales of securities purchased in a Tier 2 offering that 
do not meet the condition of one of the exemptions from state 
registration must be registered with state securities 
regulators.”48 
2. How Reg. CF Differs from Other Exempt and Nonexempt 
Offerings 
a. 1933 Act Offerings49 
Reg. CF filings and 1933 Act offerings differ significantly.  
Other than involving the same three discernable players—a 
company, a funding portal, and an investor—there is not much 
similarity between these methods of offering securities.  
Differences include transaction structure and size, investment 
research availability, liquidity, market share, exchange systems, 
and the types of securities offered.  First and foremost is the cost.  
In a 1933 Act public offering, the costs start at $4.2 million in 
offering costs directly attributable to the IPO, plus underwriter 
fees equal to 4% to 7% of gross proceeds.50 
Pursuant to Reg. CF, for the first time, small investors are 
allowed to buy small dollar amounts of unregistered securities 
from companies.  The SEC’s threshold bifurcates investors into 
 
47 Knyazeva, supra note 42, at 3 n.8. 
48 Id. at 26 n.59 (citing Securities Act Rules, Questions and Answers of General 
Applicability, Question 182.10, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 
2017)). 
49 Registration under the 1933 Act includes registering a set of documents, 
including a prospectus, which are filed with the SEC before an entity goes public and 
quarterly and annual reports after the entity goes public. See Registration Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (last updated Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html. See also Alexander F. 
Cohen, Financial Statement Requirements in US Securities Offerings, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harv 
ard.edu/2017/02/05/financial-statement-requirements-in-us-securities-offerings/. 
50 Considering an IPO to fuel your company’s future?, PWC, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2019); see also Jay Preston, Note, Initial Coin Offerings: Innovation, 
Democratization and the SEC, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 318, 328 (2018) (estimating 
between $4 and $28 million). 
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two categories: those who have more than $100,000 in income 
and those with less than $100,000.  The SEC further clarified 
that if both an investor’s income and net worth are less than 
$100,000, then the amount invested could not exceed $2,000 or 
5% of their net worth—whichever is greater.51  However, there is 
no floor to the income and net worth, with issuers relying on 
their funding portals to assess investor limits and 
qualifications.52  The securities offered continue to be of high risk 
with provisions that seemingly protect companies more than the 
investors. 
Reg. CF investors have a one-year restriction on the resale of 
Reg. CF and other restricted stock purchased from other safe 
harbor transactions.  The reasonableness of these resale 
restrictions continues to be debated.  Legal scholars have argued 
that allowing companies to sell stock through crowdfunding and 
mini-IPOs is not enough—securities regulations must allow 
investors to resell that stock.53  Oranburg makes three 
arguments to support the view that more liquidity is 
fundamental to meet the normative goals of crowdfunding.  First, 
investors are discouraged from investing because they do not 
have a way to liquidate their stock easily in a resale market.54  
Second, capital continues to be consolidated in more mature 
companies instead of young organizations.55  Third, wealthy and 
influential investors can resell large blocks of stock and can do so 
in secret trading environments.56  The liquidity is also 
problematic for investors, as there may not be a ready and 
available market for their newly purchased security.  Oranburg’s 
solution is to call for a “144B” venture-exchange safe harbor, in 
 
51 See Dibadj, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that the SEC “bifurcates investors into 
two categories: those whose annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 and 
those whose annual income or net worth is at or above that amount”). 
52 See Dibadj, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that the issuer may rely on the 
intermediary to assess these limits). 
53 See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–16. See also, Roberta Romano, 
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359, 2399 (1998). 
54 See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–1016. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. Oranburg defines dark-pool markets as trading markets available and 
known to very few investors and further notes that these dark-pool markets are 
“private stock markets that are not accessible by the general investing public.” See 
id. at 1047. 
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addition to the “144A” safe harbor for venture transactions on the 
over-the-counter markets.57 
Also, a resale exchange for Reg. CF investment 
crowdfunding transactions does not currently exist.  For 
example, an investor holding less than $100 can buy publicly 
offered 1933 Act securities and then trade publicly traded stock 
freely on their own or through a registered broker/dealer.58  
Securities can also be bought under Reg. CF, but resale is not 
readily available.  To solve the resale and liquidity problems, 
lawmakers have presented two promising bills that passed the 
U.S. House of Representatives.  The first bill is the Main Street 
Growth Act.59  The Main Street Growth Act amends the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to allow for the registration of 
venture exchanges with the SEC to provide a venue that is 
tailored to the needs of small and emerging companies and offers 
qualifying companies one venue in which their securities can 
trade.60  The second bill is the Crowdfunding Amendments Act.  
This bill would allow crowdfunding investors to pool their money 
together into a fund that is advised by a registered investment 
advisor.61 
In 1933 Act offerings, traditional offerings have included 
common stock, preferred stock, and debt instruments.  However, 
in Reg. CF offerings, securities offerings can include standard 
equity, debt, revenue participations, and a variety of investment 
 
57 See id. at 1055–57 (noting curiosity surrounding why “the SEC has not 
already acted to create a domestic venture exchange”). 
58 For members of the public, stocks on NYSE and NASDAQ can be purchased 
at small dollar amounts with brokerage fees as low as $5.95. Online Broker Partners, 
NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/online-brokers/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2019); see also NYSE Exchange Fees, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.inter 
activebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=934 (last visited Feb. 17, 2019); Pricing, TD 
AMERITRADE, https://www.tdameritrade.com/pricing.page (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) 
(stock trades at $6.95 over the internet). 
59 Main Street Growth Act is sponsored by Rep. Tom Emmer (R-MN). Main 
Street Growth Act, H.R. 5877, 115th Congress (2017-2018). H.R. 5877 was 
introduced on May 18, 2018 and passed the House on July 10, 2018. Id. On July 11, 
2018, the bill was received in the Senate and read twice and referred to the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Id. It would allow for the 
registration of venture exchanges with the SEC to provide a venue that is tailored to 
the needs of small and emerging companies and offers qualifying companies one 
venue in which their securities can trade. Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Crowdfunding Amendments Act, H.R. 6380, 115th Congress (2017-2018). 
H.R. 6380 was introduced in the House on July 16, 2018 and referred to the House 
Committee on Financial Services on July 16, 2018. Id. 
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contracts,62 that funding portals have developed and promoted for 
a company’s use.63  Companies have begun to offer more complex 
investment contracts, such as SAFE—simple agreements for 
future equity, KISS—keep it simple securities, and contractual 
revenue sharing agreements.64  The SAFEs are not debt 
instruments, but rather future equity instruments, whereby 
shareholders have no voting or shareholder rights, and no lender 
rights or priorities.65  A KISS, on the other hand, is a debt 
instrument that offers convertible securities (equity or debt) with 
favorable terms, like significant investor rights, protections, and 
preferences upon conversion into equity.66  The research findings 
demonstrate the continuation of SAFE investment contract 
security offerings.67 
Under Reg. CF, there has been a growth in the number of 
investment contracts known as the simple agreement for future 
token (“SAFT”)—an investment contract between a purchaser 
and seller that promises the delivery of digital tokens or other 
equity/debt instruments in the future,68 conditionally or 
unconditionally.69  SAFT and its corollary future digital tokens 
expanded in Reg. CF offerings between November of 2017 
 
62 Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 589. Wroldsen identified two new forms of 
simplified contracts, "SAFE" and “KISS," securities, specially tailored for 
crowdfunding investment offerings with high-growth potential. These securities hold 
great promise, though not without drawbacks. Wroldsen developed an 
understanding of the taxonomy, terms, and variations in crowdfunding investment 
contracts, illustrating a baseline, standardized investment contract, as well as the 
emerging SAFE and KISS. Id. See also Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, 
Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 170–75 
(2016). 
63 Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 546. 
64 Id. at 582; see also Giorgia Coltella, SAFE vs. KISS, The Evolution of the 
Convertible Note, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/centrally/safe-vs-
kiss-the-evolution-of-the-convertible-note-4859d42a867d. 
65 Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 573. 
66 Id. at 570–71. 
67 As of June 2018, outside of common stock transactions, SAFEs were the 
number one type of security offered by two of the top five largest funding portals. 
68 Pete Martin, What the Cardozo Report Gets Right and Wrong About SAFT’s 
Approach to ICO Self-regulation, MEDIUM (Dec. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/votem/ 
what-the-cardozo-report-gets-right-and-wrong-about-safts-approach-to-ico-self-
regulation-3bf7fbcc7be5 (citing NOT SO FAST—RISKS RELATED TO THE USE OF A 
“SAFT” FOR TOKEN SALES (Cardozo Blockchain Project Research Reprt #1 Nov. 21, 
2017)). See also Averie Brookes, U.S. Regulation of Blockchain Currencies: A Policy 
Overview, 9 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 75, 102 (2018) (noting a company’s use of a 
SAFT to launch its token sale and later development of a working model for self-
regulation). 
69 See infra Part I.C. 
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through June 30, 2018.70  “The distinctive feature of SAFT is that 
it splits the promise of future tokens from the distribution of 
operational tokens.”71 
In 2016, Joseph Green evaluated investment contracts 
offered under Reg. CF and found that SAFEs were not so “safe” 
or appropriate investments, as many of the companies would not 
actually be able to raise venture capital funding.72  At this time, 
the typical SAFE was a security developed by a Silicon Valley 
company accelerator named Y Combinator for companies 
expecting to raise institutional venture capital funding at a later 
date.73  Time will tell whether they will be suitable investments 
for investors. Reg. CF offerings are occurring within a broader 
context of advancements in distributed ledger technology,74 which 
present new opportunities and challenges for companies in their 
quest to raise capital, and offer complexity for the investing 
public and regulators.75  
Reg. CF offerings and 1933 Act offerings are similar in that 
both have notice requirements and companies are subject to 
liability under Reg. CF investment crowdfunding.  Securities 
may be sold to any member of the public in small amounts, but 
with a smaller cap of $1.07 million for Reg. CF companies, 
compared to offerings in other safe harbor exemptions.  Second, 
neither purchase requires that the investor be sophisticated or 
accredited like other exempt filings require.  Third, investors can 
lose their money from buying shares and other investment 
 
70 See infra Part I.C. 
71 See WERBACH, supra note 18, at 207 (noting that the initial transaction is 
typically handled under SEC Regulation D or Regulation Crowdfunding, two of the 
exceptions to the registration requirements for securities offerings). 
72 See Green & Coyle, supra note 62, at 170, 174 (warning that “the 
nomenclature ‘SAFE’ may actually be somewhat misleading” and that “[t]he safety 
implied by the clever acronym ‘SAFE’ actually points to the instrument’s safety for 
the issuing company—which is able to avoid the maturity dates associated with 
convertible notes—rather than any safety for the investor.”). 
73 See id. at 171. 
74 The technological phase relates to the new cryptocurrency heights that have 
recently been accomplished. First, there has been success in raising small dollar 
amounts via Reg. CF to serve as a first step before a second round of funding. 
Second, there have been successful ICOs, Reg. D and Reg A+ are raising significant 
dollars in cryptocurrency, despite recent legal travails, fraud, and hacking. Third, 
the development of blockchain and complimentary exchanges tie in to the future 
trading of Reg. CF tokens. 
75 See Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 551 (discussing inherent risks of crowdfunding 
investments, including inherent uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-
stage startup companies; sophistication of ordinary investors; and fraud running 
rampant). 
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instruments from a company registered under the 1933 Act, 
possibly as easily as they might under Reg. CF.  This means that 
for both 1933 Act publicly offered securities and investment 
crowdfunding: (1) securities are available publicly; (2) investors 
need not be sophisticated or accredited investors before purchase; 
and, (3) investors can risk the loss of their investment.  Both 
offerings must be mindful not to violate § 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act.76   
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to “use 
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.”77  Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “to 
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading,” as well as to engage in other manipulative and 
deceptive activities.78 
b. Exempt Offerings 
From the perspectives of both companies and investors, 
complying with securities laws is wrought with complexity.  For a 
company, after the entity has decided to raise capital, it must 
determine whether it wants to issue common or preferred stock, 
debt, or possibly an investment contract.  Once that decision is 
made, there is a need to determine which exemption is best to 
proceed with if they do want to sell a security.  Not discussed in 
this Article is the possibility of filing an intrastate security 
offering.  Many states have passed their own state-level 
crowdfunding exemptions, which exempt small business 
intrastate crowdfunding from federal securities registration.79  As 
 
76 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
77 Id. In Morris v. Overstock.com, the company was sued under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations or omissions made to shareholders on their 
intent to engage in an ICO. Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal 
Securities Laws at 2–3, Morris v. Overstock.com, (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2018) (No.2:18-
cv-00271-PMW). 
78 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5(b) (2019). 
79 Evan Glustrom, Note, Intrastate Crowdfunding in Alaska: Is There Security 
In Following The Crowd?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 308 (2017) (“[t]hese state-level 
regulations completely exempt intrastate crowdfunding from SEC regulation so long 
as the issuer is organized in the state and all investors reside in the state”). 
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of 2016, the majority of intrastate crowdfunding provisions 
required a notice filing with a state regulator.80  However, there 
are unrealistic limitations of selling only to in-state investors.  
While there may be a variety of exemptions available, there may 
be only one viable choice. 
There are many differences between Reg. CF offerings and 
other exempt filings.81  For example, Reg. D offerings under the 
1933 Act allow two exemptions from § 5 registration 
requirements under Rules 50482 and 506.83  These offerings are 
considered private and have different restrictions than a public 
offering.  Reg. D offerings, which can only be made to accredited 
sophisticated investors, can be resold under Rules 144 and 144A 
with volume restrictions.84  But, resale restrictions continue for 
non-accredited investors.85 
There are additional restrictions and limitations on Reg. D 
safe harbor exemptions.  In Rule 504 offerings, issuers are 
limited to offering up to $5 million in securities in a twelve-
month period, provided that the offerings are consistent with the 
public interest, and certain bad actors are disqualified from 
participation.86   
Rule 504 currently permits the resale of securities issued in 
Rule 504 offerings that involve general solicitation or 
advertising where either the offering is registered in one or 
more states and one or more states require the dissemination of 
a state-approved disclosure document or the offering is exempt 
but sales are only made to accredited investors.87   
 
80 See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-10238 (Oct. 26, 2016). E.g., Alabama, Arizona, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and 
the District of Columbia. Other states have pending legislation that would require 
notice filings for intrastate crowdfunded offerings, e.g., California, Hawaii, Missouri, 
Nevada, and New Hampshire. 
81 The Commission amended Rule 504, effective January 20, 2017. Id. at 76–82. 
It also repealed Rule 50, effective May 22, 2017. Id. at 82–86. Finally, the 
Commission adopted new rule 147A as a safe harbor to the Section 3(a)(11) 
exemption, effective April 20, 2017. Id. at 16. 
82 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (2018). 
83 Id. § 230.506(a). 
84 See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1026–27. 
85 Id. at 1025. 
86 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 75. 
87 Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-10238 (Oct. 26, 2016). 
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“Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation and limits sales to 
no more than 35 non-accredited investors” whereas Rule 506(c) 
allows general solicitation to an unlimited number of accredited 
investors.88  Under 506(c), companies may sell to an unlimited 
number of accredited investors, but cannot solicit investors.89 In 
the next Section, some additional background is provided about 
the emergence of crowdfunding and other available exemptions 
and safe harbors operative during the new investment 
crowdfunding era. 
Outside of the costs and limitations trading, theoretically, 
there is no reason that Reg. CF offerings could not succeed 
and serve as an extremely positive force.  Positive outcomes 
include the democratization of company offerings,90 lower 
crowdfunding transaction costs,91 increasing shareholder choice, 
and funding portal inclusivity and efficiency.92  However, a flood 
of speculative, risky, and uncertain securities may hinder 
positive outcomes.  The worst case is that the macro benefits 
of this particular safe harbor are hijacked.  Hijacking may be 
a strong term to use, but it may be appropriate to the extent 
that a flood of largely unregulated and potentially volatile 
securities,93 securities fraud risk,94 or unfettered exuberance may 
 
88 Id. at 86; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (“Each purchaser who is not an 
accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment . . . .”). 
89 See Preston, supra note 50, at 326. 
90 See Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 35, at 347 (arguing that equity 
crowdfunding “enhances access to capital for SMEs globally while simultaneously 
democratizing access to investments for ordinary citizens”); see also Oranburg, supra 
note 4, at 1029–31 (discussing the JOBS Act’s potential to achieve purported goals of 
democratizing access to capital, creating jobs, and growing the innovation economy). 
91 See Lee, supra note 7, at 68–69 and accompanying text. 
92 See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 912 (theorizing that securities crowdfunding 
campaigns have a tension between inclusiveness and efficiency: “[t]he SEC 
concluded, again, probably correctly, that some level of exclusivity is needed for 
crowdfunding to work; total inclusivity is simply too inefficient to function”). 
93 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes 
to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 35 (2017) (advocating four 
approaches regarding how to properly regulate FinTech, which include: “doing 
nothing,” “cautious permissiveness through flexibility and forbearance,” “restricted 
experimentation,” “and regulatory development”). 
94 In the midst of the SEC’s adoption of Reg. CF, scholars wrote about investor 
protection, securities fraud, and finding ways to balance what was perceived as an 
opening for widespread theft of investors’ contributions. See Darian M. Ibrahim, 
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 606–07 (2015); 
Dibadj, supra note 6, at 31, 39–44; Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan 
Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 
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thwart the goals of the Crowdfund Act and hinder them from 
being realized. 
3. Reg. CF Offerings and the Sale of Digital Tokens 
The issuance of digital tokens reliant on blockchain 
technology is an explosive development in capital fundraising 
campaigns.95  Most of this activity is happening in the IPO 
markets, but some of the activity is occurring in Reg. CF 
offerings.  This development has skeptics and proponents.  On 
the one hand, billionaire investor Warren Buffett says “ ‘[s]tay 
away from it. It’s a mirage.’ ”96  Meanwhile, former U.S. CFTC 
Chairman, Gary Gensler, states that “blockchain 
technology . . . underlying bitcoin has a real chance to be a 
catalyst for change in the world of finance, and that’s because it 
moves data and it also applies [] computer code across  a 
decentralized network.”97 
To understand these assets and securities, the terms tokens, 
crypto tokens, cryptocurrency, and blockchain ledger technology 
are briefly described below.  The definition of the word token has  
recently been revised to: “a piece resembling a coin issued for 
use . . . by a particular group on specified terms,” “issued as 
money by some person or body other than a de jure government,” 
or  “a unit of cryptocurrency.”98  Historically, the word token 
represented a tangible item, such as a bus token or a game token.  
Practitioners and scholars classify tokens as “digital tokens,” 
with a unit of value tied to a blockchain ledger.99  The token’s 
 
TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration 
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439–40 (2012). 
95 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 463. 
96 Mitch Tuchman, Heed Warren Buffett’s Warning: Bitcoin is Pure FOMO, 
MARKETWATCH (February 10, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heed-
warren-buffetts-warning-bitcoin-is-pure-fomo-2017-12-26 (“ ‘[t]he idea that it has 
some huge intrinsic value is just a joke, in my view’ ”).   
97 Dave Liedtka, Most Tokens From ICOs Are Securities, Former CFTC Head 
Says, BLOOMBERG (October 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-10-15/most-tokens-from-icos-are-securities-former-cftc-head-says. 
98 Token, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
token (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). Cryptocurrency is defined as “any form of currency 
that only exists digitally, that usually has no central issuing or regulating authority 
but instead uses a decentralized system to record transactions and manage the 
issuance of new units, and that relies on cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and 
fraudulent transactions.” Cryptocurrency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). 
99 Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 70 (describing digital tokens as 
representing a unit of value, which may make them look more like commodities, 
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“virtual” or “digitized” characteristic evokes the colloquial term 
“crypto token,” a term used by the tech industry to describe 
virtual currencies or digital assets tied to the blockchain,100 and 
recently by courts and the SEC as “cryptocurrency ‘tokens’ or 
‘coins.’ ”101  Digital tokens can be a reward, combining functional 
and consumptive elements, and also can be fundamental to a 
blockchain network.102  Tokens can be purchased either with cash 
or by using other coins.103  Tokens are also potentially tradeable 
and transferable through an exchange for another coin or an item 
of value.104  Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has 
ruled that digital tokens will be treated as property for federal 
income tax purposes.105 
The SEC mandates that funding portals host a company’s 
offering to investors.  To visualize the role of the funding portal, 
using Werbach’s square surrounded by six circles is helpful.  An 
intermediary is a central player in the offering and provides a 
role between the company and the investor, as follows: 










stating:  “There is tremendous flexibility in how to structure digital tokens and what 
those digital tokens may represent.”). Nathan Dudgeon & Gareth Malna, Distributed 
Ledger Technology: From Blockchain to ICOs, 37 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y 
REP. 4, 4 (February 2018) (“A blockchain facilitates online transactions by acting as 
a secure, digitized, decentralized, public ledger.”). 
100 Michael Patterson, Crypto’s 80% Plunge is Now Worse Than the Dot-Com 
Crash, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
09-12/crypto-s-crash-just-surpassed-dot-com-levels-as-losses-reach-80. 
101 United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
102 Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 75 n.47. 
103 See Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346339, at *5 (noting the type of currency, such as 
Bitcoin or ether, that can purchase an app token); see also infra Part I.C. 
104 See infra Part I.C. 
105 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (Apr. 14, 2014).  
106 See WERBACH, supra note 18, at 25–27.Werbach describes an “intermediary” 
as one connoted by the box as a “trust architecture,” with the intermediary taking 
“the place of social norms and government-issued laws to structure transactions.” Id. 
at 27. 
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Examples of large enterprises utilizing intermediary models 
are Amazon, eBay, Uber, and Airbnb, where the consumer goes 
to their respective platform selling the items of a third party 
business.107  This intermediary model for funding portals was 
adopted by the SEC, but it may provide a false sense of security 
for investors. The funding portal has limited liability and the 
funding portal isn’t designing the disclosure language included in 
the offering by the companies.  What is more ironic about 
centralizing the intermediary funding portal function, is that for 
digital tokens, what is offered would be a different type of 
securities model because the security is reliant on the 
development of the blockchain network. 
Werbach illustrates how a blockchain network operates, 
which he describes as one where “nothing is assumed to be 
trustworthy . . . except the output of the network itself . . . . [and] 
defines th[is] landscape for the blockchain’s interactions with 
law, regulation, and governance.”108  
It may be a minor point, but it is unclear what the real value 
of the funding portals is, outside of centralizing an activity that 
will inevitably become decentralized. 
Why would a company use these blockchain-based digital 
tokens?  This method allows a business to create its own digital 
assets for sale to the public—similar to an initial public 
offering.109  These digital tokens are developed to reside on an 
issuing company’s own blockchain and can represent an asset or 
a utility,110 a right to services and other goods, as well as a 
variety of other uses.111  Some companies are offering digital 
tokens because they seek to become a dominant competitive 
player in this developing innovation.  Furthermore, blockchain-
 
107 Id. at 28. 
108 See id. at 29. 
109 See Dudgeon & Malna, supra note 99, at 6 (providing a definition and an 
explanation why ICOs are so popular globally). 
110 See infra Part I.C. 
111 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21. The authors provide distinctions between 
different types of tokens reliant on blockchain technology: e.g., utility tokens, “which 
have both consumptive and speculative characteristics;” protocol tokens, which are 
tokens used “to compensate parties for participation in some activity that 
contributes to the maintenance of the blockchain and its network” e.g., a token to the 
person(s) that validate cryptographic hash for a block; and app tokens which are 
“created by deploying a smart contract program on the Ethereum network[.]” Id. at 
468, 470, 474. 
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based token offerings sold to Reg. CF investors are occasionally a 
testing ground for future ICOs.112 
4. Digital Token Regulatory Controversy 
Scholars argue that there are three categories of regulatory 
controversy: illegality, validity, and classification regarding the 
broader category called “cryptocurrency.”113  There are 
overlapping jurisdictions among federal regulators regarding the 
regulation of digital tokens, from the CFTC, the SEC, the 
Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, and the IRS.114  
One court has stated that the CFTC has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the SEC over the future of digital currencies.115  Recently, 
the SEC found that cryptocurrencies issued for the purpose of 
raising funds are securities and thus subject to securities laws.116  
The SEC has also set up a new Cyber Unit which is issuing alerts 
for investors of coin offerings.117  The IRS continues with its 
 
112 Michael R. Meadows, Note, The Evolution of Crowdfunding: Reconciling 
Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial Coin Offerings, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
272, 273 (2018) (Meadows’ article focused principally on ICOs as a method of 
crowdfunding, noting that “[w]hile ICOs serve as an effective method of raising 
capital, crypto-crowdfunding may repackage traditional crowdfunding models that 
would otherwise trigger federal securities laws.”). In their own right, ICOs are a 
crowdfunding method used by companies to raise capital selling digital assets (e.g. 
digital token) that utilize blockchain technology. 
113 WERBACH, supra note 18, at 178. 
114 Jai R. Massari et al., The Fragmented Regulatory Landscape for Digital 
Tokens, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/26/the-fragmented-regulatory-landscape-
for-digital-tokens/; see also Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McDonnell, 
287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (entering a Preliminary Injunction Order 
against Defendants Patrick K. McDonnell and CabbageTech, Corp. d/b/a Coin Drop 
Markets and affirming the CFTC’s January 18, 2018 complaint charging defendants 
with fraud and misappropriation in connection with purchases and trading of the 
virtual currencies Bitcoin and LiteCoin). 
115 McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (affirming that CFTC has standing to 
exercise its enforcement power over fraud related to virtual currencies sold in 
interstate commerce and granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the CFTC). 
116 Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: 
Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 112, 116 n.10 (2018); see also Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, 
Exchange Act Release No. 81027 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report]. 
117 Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives 
to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-176. See also Investor Alert: Public 
Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, INVESTOR.GOV (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-
alert-public-companies-making-ico-related (last visited on Feb. 18, 2019). The SEC's 
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exclusive jurisdiction over taxation of tokens, and to the extent 
that a crime has been committed, the Department of Justice may 
intervene.  Thus, to better understand the legality of the various 
jurisdictional questions, companies need to be counseled wisely 
about various agency considerations. 
With respect to classification, the current regulatory 
framework for digital tokens and cryptocurrencies has been 
described as a “fragmented, overlapping, and complex regulatory 
landscape,”118 including its treatment as property for federal 
income tax purposes.119  Some argue that the use of SAFTs for 
the purchase of “pre-functional” tokens delivers a “functional” 
token that ultimately is not a security.120  Others argue the use of 
a SAFT likely muddies the analysis of whether a utility token is 
a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities law.121 
According to a recent SEC report pursuant to Section 21(a), 
the SEC applied longstanding securities law principles to 
demonstrate that a token constituted an investment contract, 
and therefore, was a security under U.S. federal securities 
laws.122  The SEC concluded that this DAO digital token offering 
represented an investment of money in a common enterprise 
with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.123  It also noted 
that “merely calling a token a utility token or structuring it to 
provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a 
security.”124  Applying the Howey test,125 the SEC’s arguments 
 
Office of Investor Education and Advocacy issued an Investor Alert in August 2017 
warning investors about scams of companies claiming to be engaging in ICOs. 
118 Massari et al., supra note 114; see also Meadows, supra note 112, at 272–73. 
Meadows’ article focuses principally on ICOs as a method of crowdfunding. However, 
Meadows notes the “unique issues crypto-crowdfunding poses to participating 
consumers and regulatory authorities” as well as issues “with the emergence of 
blockchain technology, which adds an additional layer of complexity in determining 
whether federal securities laws apply to a crowdfunding campaign.” Id. at 273. 
119 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (Apr. 14, 2014). 
120 Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 76. 
121 Id. at 76. 
122 DAO Report, supra note 116, at 15. See also Preston, supra note 50, at 322 
(stating that the Howey test can be refined to four factors to consider an investment 
contract a security: (1) “[i]t is an investment of money; (2) [t]he investment of money 
is in a common enterprise; (3) [a]ny profit comes from the efforts of a promotor or 
third party; and (4) [t]here is an expectation of profits from the investment.”). 
123 DAO Report, supra note 116, at 15. 
124 Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Jay Clayton, Statement on 
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11. 
125 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
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would seemingly apply to tokens and other offerings would be 
securities. These tokens incorporate features and marketing 
efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others which 
arehallmarks of a security under U.S. law.126 
However, while companies issue digital tokens under the 
applicable safe harbors, the SEC’s ability to regulate in this 
market is not settled.  Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White 
distinguished virtual currencies as not necessarily being 
securities; she also stated that interest and returns could be 
subject to securities regulation.  Well-publicized ICO offerings 
make up a much greater portion of ICOs than do Reg. CF digital 
tokens.127  That being said, ICOs are being closely monitored by 
the SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC.128  Reg. CF blockchain-based 
offerings on the other hand, are not monitored in the same way 
because companies file the required and periodic notices with the 
SEC, including disclosure documents that include the predictions 
of risk affiliated with the offerings. 
The method by which digital tokens are offered and sold to 
investors varies in that the offerings “can take many different 
forms, and the rights and interests a coin is purported to provide 
the holder can vary.”129  Digital tokens can be offered to 
purchasers outside of the United States under Reg. S as long as 
the tokens do not flow back to the United States.130  The digital 
tokens can be registered, offered, and sold to shareholders under 
Rule 144131 of the 1933 Act or under a safe harbor exemption (e.g. 
Reg. A, Reg. A+, Reg. D), as long as the company complies with 
the requirements of these alternatives. 
 
126 Press Release, Statement on Cryptocurrencies, supra note 124 (“On this and 
other points where the application of expertise and judgment is expected, I believe 
that gatekeepers and others, including securities lawyers, accountants and 
consultants, need to focus on their responsibilities. I urge you to be guided by the 
principal motivation for our registration, offering process and disclosure 
requirements: investor protection and, in particular, the protection of our Main 
Street investors.”). 
127 See infra Part I.C. 
128 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 465 (noting that “the Securities 
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) and its counterparts in other jurisdictions have 
turned their attention to token sales”). 
129 Press Release, Statement on Cryptocurrencies, supra note 124. 
130 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 508 n.226 (referencing Reg. S, 
17 C.F.R. § 230.904 for offshore filings). 
131 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2018). 
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Since Reg. CF’s inception, over 1,100 companies have offered 
over $600 million of securities to investors under Reg. CF.132  
These amounts represent a sizable expansion in investment 
crowdfunding under these agency rules and rebuts the notion 
that few would use the exemption.133  A part of that growth is 
attributed to the surprising development of Reg. CF “digital 
token” or “blockchain-based token” offerings, which represent a 
newer type of investment contract, distinguishable and 
seemingly more complex than prior investment contracts offered 
under Reg. CF.  These type of token offerings are proliferating 
and being sold to investors, growing at a greater pace than 
traditional investment crowdfunding securities offerings.  If 
growth continues at this pace, these Reg. CF digital tokens will 
expand the type and quality of securities historically offered to 
investors. 
Digital tokens are being offered and sold through both 
investment contracts under Reg. CF134 and through registered 
ICOs.135  ICOs represent a significant number of the tokens sold 
outside of Reg. CF digital tokens.  However, digital tokens are 
also being offered and sold without registration, a method subject 
to enhanced scrutiny by the SEC and other state securities 
enforcement agencies.136 
 
132 Details about the companies and total amounts raised in investment 
crowdfunding campaigns are discussed infra Part I.C. The total offerings do not 
include any amounts offered or raised in ICOs nor any amounts raised under other 
available securities exemptions, such as Reg. A+ or Reg. D. Also, this figure does not 
represent success or failure in amounts actually raised under the campaign. 
133 Of the 1,112 filings, several duplications were removed from the data. 
134 See infra Part I.C. 
135 Not to be confused with registered ICOs, digital tokens offered under Reg. CF 
are offered and sold in transactions exempt from federal securities laws governing 
the registration of securities offerings. There are a variety of securities laws that 
still apply to Reg. CF filings, including disclosures about the companies, insider 
trading, and limitations on the transactions allowed (e.g., amount offered by the 
issuer is under $1.07 million in any twelve-month period and small dollar amounts 
sold to investors). Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 5. This Article seeks to 
address the scope and effect of token offering campaigns on companies and their 
investors and to provide recommendations as to how regulators may want to rethink 
Reg. CF investment crowdfunding in light of developments in Reg. CF token 
offerings. 
136 Brian Fung, State Regulators Unveil Nationwide Crackdown On Suspicious 
Cryptocurrency Investment Schemes, WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/21/state-regulators-unveil-nationwide-
crackdown-on-suspicious-cryptocurrency-investment-schemes/?utm_term=.e342 
d426441b (“Securities regulators across the United States and Canada announced 
dozens of investigations . . . into potentially deceitful cryptocurrency investment 
products, the largest coordinated crackdown to date by state and provincial officials 
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Digital tokens are a more recent development in capital 
formation.137  These offerings present yet another difference 
between crowdfunding and 1933 Act registered offerings.  On the 
one hand, these digital token offerings are a novel and innovative 
solution for company capital formation that appears to be 
intriguing the public.  In the short term, companies are 
beginning to raise money to grow their businessess, advance the 
business’ mission, and satisfy the crowd’s healthy appetite to 
invest.  In that respect, investment crowdfunding via Reg. CF 
shows promising signs of being an innovative bridge towards the 
goal of capital formation.  However, if issuing a token was as 
simple as providing a consumer good to an interested buyer, the 
story would be over.  The coins might be located next to a comic 
book or beanie baby collection and noone would care.  However, 
there is a variety to the characteristics of digital tokens.  A 
digital token could be used as a functional utility used to 
consume a product or service, as an investment security with 
possible growth potential, or as a commodity like gold or silver.138 
It is important to note a few distinctions in ICO digital 
tokens and Reg. CF blockchain-based tokens.  To put the two in 
perspective, one should first understand the varying volumes of 
the offering activity over the past few years.  First, Rohr and 
Wright reported that in 2016 less than $100 million in ICO 
digital tokens were sold, but by October 2017, that number grew 
to over $3.7 billion.139  Current estimates show that by March 
2018, ICO digital tokens had continued to grow rapidly to $11.3 
billion, with a single $1.7 billion transaction by a company 
named Telegram.140  However, the top 100 cryptocurrencies sold 
 
on Bitcoin scams . . . . The state agencies are also pursuing suspicious cases of initial 
coin offerings, or ICOs, a fundraising technique used by both legitimate and 
illegitimate cryptocurrency projects in ways that resemble initial public offerings of 
stock.”). 
137 See infra Part I.C; see also Knyazeva, supra note 42 (regarding Reg. A 
financing, Knyazeva states that as of October 31, 2016, prospective issuers had 
publicly filed offering statements for 147 Reg. A+ offerings, for $2.6 billion in 
financing). Of the exempt filings, Reg. D offerings for 2016 had 23,292 offerings 
totaling over $2 trillion dollars. See Jonathan Nieh, Update on Regulation D: Data 
from 2016 Form D’s, CROWDFUND INSIDER (April 19, 2017), https://www.crowdfund 
insider.com/2017/04/97876-update-regulation-d-data-2016-form-ds/. 
138 See infra Part I.C. 
139 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 465. 
140 David Floyd, $6.3 Billion: 2018 ICO Funding Has Passed 2017's Total, 
COINDESK (April 19, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-funding-
already-outpaced-2017/ (noting that in just the first quarter of 2018, $6.3 billion of 
ICO digital tokens were raised, representing 118% of the 2017 total of $5 billion). 
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globally have a market capitalization of over $208 billion, with 
Bitcoin having a market capitalization of $112.7 billion in 
September 2018,141 which dropped to $58 billion by December 6, 
2018.142 
Growing rapidly, but at a lesser magnitude than ICO digital 
tokens, are Reg. CF digital tokens, which didn’t begin selling at 
all until the fall of 2017.143  The offerings then grew to $22 
million between November 2017 and June 30, 2018.144  Relatively 
speaking, there is no real comparison with the global explosion 
that has taken place between ICO digital tokens and Reg. CF 
digital tokens.  Reg. CF digital tokens are a small, but growing 
part of the token expansion.  However, what distinguishes these 
offerings is that the Reg. CF investors are members of the public, 
not necessarily sophisticated investors. 
 To determine whether digital tokens offered under Reg. CF 
are investment contracts and thus, potentially securities, one 
would look to the Howey standard.145  Under the Howey standard, 
whether there is an “investment contract” under the Securities 
Act depends on “whether the scheme involves an investment of 
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from 
the efforts of others.” In addition, the Court in Howey further 
clarified,  “[i]f that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the 
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a 
sale of property with or without intrinsic value.”146 
Multiple federal and state agencies are pondering just how 
digital tokens should be classified and the extent to which 
agencies should regulate them.  Historically, the 1933 Act has 
created private rights of action to aid the enforcement of 
obligations pertaining to securities offerings.147  Towards that 
 
141 COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited on Feb. 20, 2019). 
But cf., Kyle Torpey, Comparing Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies by ‘Market Cap’ 
Can Be Very Misleading, FORBES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ktorpey/2017/12/29/comparing-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies-by-market-cap-
can-be-very-misleading/#62cbdb832509 (“Many cryptocurrency traders track the 
price of these digital assets on sites like CoinMarketCap.com, but the key metric 
that is most often used to compare these cryptocurrencies, market cap, can 
sometimes be misleading.”). 
142 See Bitcoin, YAHOO FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BTC-USD?p= 
BTC-USD (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
143 See infra Part I.C. 
144 See infra Part I.C. 
145 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
146 Id. 
147 See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 
(2018). 
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end, the SEC has recently appointed Valerie A. Szczepanik to the 
SEC Division of Corporation Finance to oversee the securities 
laws and digital asset technologies.148  Additionally, “[t]he 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . which regulates not the 
original issuance of securities but all their subsequent trading, is 
[] enforceable through private rights of action.”149  The SEC is 
currently monitoring digital tokens as possible securities within 
the larger category of virtual currencies.150  “Digital 
tokens . . . can represent units of value, which may make them 
look more like commodities[.]”151 
Digital tokens have been distinguished from currency.  In 
contrast, digital tokens as digital currency “do[] not have any 
legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”152  Bitcoin exemplifies 
this currency distinction: it is not considered a currency in the 
United States since it lacks the recognition by any state.153 
Brian Quintenz of the CFTC has spoken on the complexity of 
the classification of tokens: 
However, just because a product is tokenized does not change 
its underlying qualities.  For example, if Disney World were to 
tokenize the admissions to its theme parks, those tokens would 





148 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Valerie A. 
Sczcepanik Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-102. Szczepanik’s new role is to 
“coordinate efforts across all SEC Divisions and Offices regarding the application of 
U.S. securities laws to emerging digital asset technologies and innovations, 
including Initial Coin Offerings and cryptocurrencies.” Id. 
149 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1062. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a law 
governing the secondary trading of securities (stocks, bonds, and debentures) in the 
United States. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2012). 
150 See Mokhtarian & Lindgren, supra note 116, at 116 n.10 
151 See Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 70. The Internal Revenue Service 
defines currency as “the coin and paper money of the United States or any other 
country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is 
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance.” 
IRS NOTICE 2014-21, SECTION 2, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (last visited April 9, 2019).   
152 Dep’t of Treasury, FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.fincen.gov/ 
sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
153 Gregory M. Karch, Bitcoin, the Law and Emerging Public Policy: Towards a 
21st Century Regulatory Scheme, 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 193, 231 (2014); see also 
Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Note, Cryptocurrencies and the Uniform Commercial 
Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 U. OF P. R. BUS. L. J.129, 132–34 (2017). 
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currencies and it does not make them securities. It makes them 
tickets.Similarly, tokenizing a security does not change the fact 
that it is a security.154 
Quintenz further explained why he thought there might be a 
frenzy around digital tokens: 
As I postulated two days ago at the City Week conference in 
London, I see three main motivations for the broader 
tokenization revolution. One motivation for a company or entity 
to tokenize a product is purely as a marketing ploy—to take 
advantage of the popular and speculative mania surrounding all 
things “token.” . . . A second motivation to create a token is to 
enable and realize the efficiency of the blockchain construct in 
assigning and tracking ownership. This is having, and will 
continue to have, an impact on title transfer and settlement 
processes.  Think of this as the back office tokenization 
revolution. Lastly, a third motivation is to utilize the 
transferability of tokens to create a secondary market for any 
and all non-tangible things—the eBay of Intangibles so to 
speak—for rights, services, permissions, etc., that the seller 
allows to be transferred between parties.155 
Because violations of § 5 may result in rescission, cautious 
companies proceed gingerly by filing under the Reg. CF 
exemption.156  Commissioner Quintenz noted the transformative 
nature of coins in ICO transactions, stating that “[t]hey may 
start their life as a security from a capital-raising perspective but 
then at some point . . . turn into a commodity.”157  The next 
 
154 Brian Quintenz, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Remarks at the Eurofi High Level Seminar (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11. 
155 Id. Commissioner Quintenz also complimented the secondary market 
development: “Empowering a secondary market’s price discovery and valuation 
functions for products that were previously untransferable—such as extra storage 
space on a home computer—is a fascinating development.” Id. 
156 Indeco, Offering Statement (Form C) (June 27, 2018). Indeco’s CEO explains 
why his company had enough concerns to proceed and file with the Securities 
Exchange Commission. He took the position that the token offering could be 
considered something other than a “utility” and more likely a “security.” Id. See also 
David Levine, Indeco Launces First Token Pre-Sale Under SEC’s Regulation 
Crowdfunding Rules, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2017), https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-
launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-regulation-crowdfunding-rules-
e82dad79345. 
157 Lukas Schor, Explaining The “Simple Agreement for Future Tokens” 
Framework, MEDIUM (Nov. 29, 2017), https://medium.com/@argongroup/explaining-
the-simple-agreement-for-future-tokens-framework-15d5e7543323 (describing 
Commissioner Quintenz’ statement as “probably the most specific comment by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regarding the classification of ICO’s and 
shows quite well the bipolar nature of many tokens”). 
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Section discusses the rationale and methodology for this research 
study and what can be learned from investment crowdfunding 
data. 
The growth of digital tokens in Reg. CF offerings raises three 
troubling concerns.  First, Reg. CF digital tokens are showing a 
greater momentum than other Reg. CF offerings.  As digital 
tokens could have different characteristics, an investor would 
need to review the particular description very closely.  Consider 
Rohr and Wright’s argument that tokens lack “homogeneity.”158  
Query, what then are investors purchasing?  Moreover, as digital 
tokens are being sold to investors to finance unbuilt technological 
funding portals and services for future ICO transactions, Reg. CF 
investors are taking the greatest risks of loss.  These 
unsophisticated and non-accredited investors are subject to a set 
of different investor qualifications and resale restrictions than 
purchasers ICO transactions, which are closely monitored by the 
SEC.  This is not the case with digital token offerings under Reg. 
CF. 
Second, the company disclosures contain the standard legend 
and the risks of investing in these type of transactions: 
A crowdfunding investment involves risk.  An investor should 
not invest any funds in this [o]ffering unless he or she can 
afford to lose his or her entire investment.  In making an 
investment decision, investors must rely on their own 
examination of the [i]ssuer and the terms of the [o]ffering, 
including the merits and risks involved . . . The securities have 
not been recommended or approved by any federal or state 
securities commission or regulatory authority.  Furthermore, 
these authorities have not passed upon the accuracy or 
adequacy of this document.  The [SEC] does not pass upon the 
merits of any [s]ecurities offered or the terms of the [o]ffering, 
nor does it pass upon the accuracy or completeness of any 
offering document or literature . . . These Securities are offered 
under the 4(a)(6) Exemption; however, the SEC has not made 
an independent determination that the [s]ecurities are exempt 




158 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 463. 
159 See Pokeology, Crowdfunding Offering Statement, NEXTSEED, at 14 (Nov. 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1720051/000172005117000001/doc 
ument1.pdf. 
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Other Reg. CF offerings go further, outlining some of the risks of 
investing in blockchain-based tokens: 
The chain code concept, the underlying software application and 
software platform . . . is still in an early development stage and 
unproven.  There is no warranty or assurance that the process 
for creating [] Tokens will be uninterrupted or error-free and 
there is an inherent risk that the software could contain defects, 
vulnerabilities, weaknesses, bugs or viruses causing the 
complete loss of [] contributions and/or [] Tokens.  Additionally, 
there are other risks associated with the acquisition, storage, 
transfer and use of [] Tokens, including those that . . . may not 
be [anticipated].  Such risks may further materialize as 
unanticipated variations or combinations of the risks.160  
The research begs the question, why, after reading these 
disclaimers, would anyone invest in digital token offerings?  If 
the blockchain token concept does not materialize, it is likely that 
the companies seeking to use them will not have adequate 
funding to repay the obligation and the investors may lose all or 
a portion of their investment. 
Third, the SEC needs to rethink how to advise 
unsophisticated investors, who may not have an income to fall 
back on if the investment fails, as do accredited investors.161  It is 
uncertain whether the underlying premise for the offerings will 
create a framework for “digital assets used in connection with 
decentralized services, applications, and communities.”162  As 
promising as these offerings may be, digital tokens are 
fundamentally based on a theoretical idea. 
While federal agencies and the courts sort out their 
respective roles in regulating cryptocurrencies,163 there is a quiet 
digital token revolution occurring within smaller Reg. CF 
campaigns. 
 
160 TrustaBit, Blockchain for Delayed Flights, at 24, https://trustabit.io/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/TrustaBit-final.pdf. 
161 Another common disclaimer in offering memoranda of Reg. CF offerings is 
“[a] crowdfunding investment involves risk. An investor should not invest any funds 
in this Offering unless he or she can afford to lose his or her entire investment.” See 
Pokeology, supra note 159, at 14. 
162 Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale 
Framework, PROTOCOL LABS, at 1 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-
Project-Whitepaper.pdf. 
163 There are a variety of proposals regarding how each agency could consider 
regulating, however that is not the subject this Article. The Author does take the 
position that it is time for Congress to recognize that digital currencies are blooming 
in the United States and globally. Congressional clarity on the digital currencies 
would be useful. 
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B. Digital Token Research and Summary of Findings 
1. Rationale and Methodology for Research Study 
There is an ongoing need for federal and state agencies, 
companies, and investors, to analyze available data to assess the 
current state of capital formation and employment under this 
new regulation.  A better understanding of the offerings and 
transactions that have transpired over the past several years 
would provide a template for future successful offerings, better 
investor protection, and better crafted regulatory policies aimed 
at accomplishing the normative goals of the regulations.  This 
Section explains the methodology behind the research project. 
This research study sought to determine if the impacts of 
Reg. CF regulations have been worthy of lament or applause.  To 
determine those effects, we turn to researching the available 
data.  After undertaking a review of the prior SEC Edgar Data, 
this Article provides information, findings, and analysis relating 
to Reg. CF campaigns in the United States.164  Researchers for 
this Article retrieved and reviewed 1,112 SEC Form C notice 
filings and other SEC filings completed by companies from Reg. 
CF’s adoption date through June 30, 2018. 
From May 2016 through June 30, 2018, companies filed 
1,112 Form C notice filings in Reg. CF transactions,165 offering 
over $600 million of securities to investors.  These Form C filings 
provide critical data about the companies that seek to offer 
equity, debt, and investment contracts, the funding portals that 
provide the portal structure, and the transactions that are 
offered to the crowd of potential investors. 
A proactive monitoring of data can illustrate the growth, 
success, and failures of companies. This would be valuable 
information to help policy makers continue to accurately set state 
and federal policy designed to enhance innovation nationwide as 
well as protect investors.166  This research provides insights on 
what has transpired since the adoption of Reg. CF.  Further, this  
 
 
164 See Form C., supra note 12. 
165 Of the 1,112 Form C filings, several were excluded because of duplication, a 
subsequent withdrawal of the filing, or a request filed as a Form C, but merely an 
extension of the timeframes. 
166 E.g., Parsont, supra note 24, at 341 (recommending that the SEC generate 
empirical data and conduct a special study on capital-raising impediments and 
investor protection). 
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Article analyzes the crowdfunding marketplace and highlights 
emerging developments and trends, along with insights on Reg. 
CF’s impact on innovation. 
The data included digitally filed responses to the following 
questions: 
1.  Company Demographics: Describe the names, incorporation 
location and principal office of companies registering 
investment offerings under the Crowdfunding Act.167 
2.  Offering Details: Type of security; Target offering; Minimum 
offering and maximum offering; Data to quantify the 
amount of securities offered per period and over time. 
3.  Funding Portal Details: Description of the name of the 
funding portal or self-funder for each offering and the 
compensation terms. 
4.  Employee Details: The number of employees the company 
disclosed on Form C. 
5.  Aggregate Amount: of capital sought by companies disclosed 
on Form C. 
There are limits to the data collection from the SEC Edgar 
database.  First, data on Edgar does not include unregistered 
investment crowdfunding campaigns.  Unregistered campaigns 
could stem from other allowed securities transactions exempt 
under other sections of the Securities laws, such as ICOs, IPOs, 
or other Reg. D and 33 Act filings.  Alternatively, the securities 
may not register because the transaction is exempt under a state-
level intrastate crowdfunding exemption.  There could 
conceivably be campaigns that companies are choosing not to 
register anywhere for various ill-advised reasons.  Also, several 
foreign registrants with principal offices located in the United 
States are not included in the choice of entity location data. 
The research in this Article differs from earlier work in that 
it was not seeking to assess the success or failure of any 
particular offerings, the totality of the success of the offerings, or 
to make a prediction about whether scholars could call this 
crowdfunding investment era a success.  Rather, the intention 
was to frame what we can infer about the scope of investment 
crowdfunding and to provide insights about the information 
 
167 Additionally, for each company, the Central Index Key (“CIK”) was also 
noted. The CIK is a unique, public number that is assigned to each entity that 
submits filings to the SEC. Use of the CIK allows the SEC to differentiate between 
filing entities with similar names. 
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retrieved.168  To that end, evaluation of the data provides insights 
on: (1) investment crowdfunding’s momentum; (2) the companies 
that had sought capital from investors; (3) the intermediation of 
the securities/transactions; and (4) geographical scope, choice of 
entity and notable inferences about the type of securities that 
were offered to investors.  As mentioned before, since digital 
tokens were noted, more detail was provided on these securities. 
2. Definition of Success 
Accomplishing the normative goals of job creation, access to 
capital, inclusion, and efficiency, would generally be thought of 
as a success under Reg. CF.  However, more research, over time, 
is needed to determine whether the regulations have succeeded 
in goal attainment.  For purposes of this research project, this 
Article defines success by three measures—company 
engagement, the amount of capital actually raised, and the 
investors successfully obtaining a positive return on their 
investment.  The level of company engagement in offering capital 
under Reg. CF is important because if companies are not 
utilizing this safe harbor exemption then it is obsolete and serves 
no purpose.  If they are turning to this form of investment 
crowdfunding, then at least they are engaging.  Another 
successful outcome would be for these companies to  raise capital 
and put that capital to use to create jobs and undertake their 
operations.  If shareholders are not receptive to company 
offerings, then again, the regulations are of no utility.  Also, it is 
as important that investors are successful, which is defined as 
the likelihood of a positive return on investment. 
In addition to the number of companies participating and the 
level of the transactions, the number of funding portals would 
provide insights about the developing story of investment 
crowdfunding.  If many companies wanted to seek capital 
through Reg. CF, but there were no funding portals to help them 
accomplish the objective, we would be discussing the dreams and 
hopes of what Reg. CF could be.  However, funding portals 
provide a separate story, as further discussed below. 
 
168 Within scope, one might assess risks and rewards. However, the results of 
many of the campaigns are still ongoing. Thus, assessing the risks and rewards 
could be the subject of a future article. 
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3. Summary of the Findings 
a. Momentum in Investment Crowdfunding 
There is an overlap in the recent discussions about emerging 
FinTech and its effect on legal theory and society.  FinTech-
enabled transactions include tools of contracting and 
commerce.169  Consequently, it is hard to imagine that 
investment crowdfunding on internet funding portals would not 
be considered within that definition or an expansion of that 
definition.  There is much to be learned about the funding portals 
that are provided for the companies to raise money and their role 
in educating investors about transactions. 
By analyzing SEC Edgar data concerning the funding portals 
that provide the internet funding portals for the securities, new 
revelations and inferences are possible.  The Form C filings 
reveal which funding portal is hosting the offering and their 
respective costs of doing the transactions.  Also, the data 
illustrates the level of a funding portal’s choice in the type of 
transactions a funding portal may choose to support.  Professor 
Schwartz’s distinctions drawn between the United States and 
New Zealand undergird the tension between efficiency versus 
inclusion.170  The data hint at levels of influence that may 
minimize inclusion in investment crowdfunding while enhancing 
efficiencies for the funding portal.  Further, the analysis also 
provides data about the funding portal’s choice of company 
transactions around the country. 
Data is provided on the funding portals and their 
intermediation.  One trend noted is towards efficiency, as fewer 
funding portals handle a greater portion of the transactions.  At 
the same time, as investment crowdfunding campaigns are 
growing, there are also more funding portals responsible for 
doing a few transactions.  The investment crowdfunding 
geographic concentrations and dispersal are noted by Professor 
Magnuson as a form of “diffusion” in the FinTech Markets.171  
Magnuson argues that FinTech has “defied [the] conventional 
 
169 Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 77 
(2018) (arguing that FinTech has a broad definition and is divided into three types, 
especially in the consumer area: efficient information gathering and monitoring; 
tools of contracting and commerce; and enforcement and dispute resolution tools). 
170 See generally Schwartz, supra note 14, at 885–86. 
171 William J. Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J. L. 
BUS. AND FIN. 159, 163. 
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understanding” of concentration of financial markets.172  In 
FinTech markets, the players have “smaller sections of the 
market, focus on narrow industry areas, and often are made up of 
a number of nimble start-ups . . . or even computer servers.”173  
From the data collected, between 2017 and 2018, funding portals 
have increasing concentrations of deals, while at the same time, 
there are more funding portals that are hosting a greater number 
of the campaigns.  A future research project could evaluate the 
role and impact of this level of funding portal concentration and 
dispersion on business capital formation.   
Reg. CF digital token offerings sold to investors are growing 
at a greater pace than traditional investment crowdfunding 
securities offerings.  If the growth continues at this pace, these 
Reg. CF digital tokens will expand the type and quality of 
securities historically offered to investors.  The Reg. CF digital 
tokens are also disrupting the investment marketplace, as these 
initial transactions are a leverage to other, future ICOs.  This 
development may provide both potentially positive and negative 
disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on 
the success of blockchain technology. 
Despite the market’s infancy, findings suggest that 
investment crowdfunding has enjoyed sustained momentum.  
There is greater breadth in the number of companies performing 
these publicly offered crowdfunding campaigns.  Campaigns can 
be measured by the increasing numbers of company principal 
office locations throughout the country, increasing amounts and 
types of securities offerings, and increasing variety in the 
companies that are participating.  Since Reg. CF’s inception, over 
1,100 companies have offered over $600 million of securities to 
investors under Reg. CF.  These amounts represent a sizable 
expansion in investment crowdfunding under these regulations, 
which rebuts the notion that few would use the exemption. 
b. Securities and Digital Token Risk 
Investors have had the opportunity to invest in a variety of 
companies’ securities offerings.  Investors in Reg. CF offerings 
need not be accredited, wealthy, or financially sophisticated,174 to 
 
172 Id. at 168. 
173 Id. at 166. 
174 Informed Investor Advisory: Crowdfunding, N. AMERICAN SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, 
(July 24, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfund 
ing/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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participate in these transactions.  Investors can invest amounts 
ranging from $2,000 to $107,000 in a twelve-month period 
depending on their income and net worth.175  Securities offerings 
have ranged from traditional, common, and preferred stock 
offerings, to less traditional options like convertible debt, 
membership, and partnership units, investment contracts, and 
digital tokens.  The SEC considers crowdfunding investments as 
exempt from registration, and the securities have resale 
restrictions that raise liquidity issues.176 
The type of securities that investors may buy from company 
crowdfunding campaigns and the risks that may flow from these 
agreements are important lines of legal research.  Legal inquiry 
into business transactions is different from business inquiry 
regarding the transactions.  In a business inquiry, one would 
want to know whether the company has good fundamentals,177 
whether it is a good business risk, and whether the market 
conditions are right for this particular type of venture so that the 
investor can receive a return on his or her investment.  But 
evaluating the text of securities and investment contracts in 
order to determine legality and risk is the realm of securities 
lawyers and tax professionals. 
There is a level of uncertainty and risk with a company 
offering digital tokens phrasing their offerings in the blockchain 
for both the company and the investor.  The classification of 
these type of securities is unsettled with questions as to whether 
the digital tokens are securities, commodities, or utilities.  This 
leads to concerns about actual investment outcomes for the 
investors who range from the sophisticated to the 
unsophisticated, and from the accredited to the non-accredited.  
In Form C filings, companies are required to identify risks that 
are specific to the business and its financial condition.178  
Generally, companies disclose language relating to risks of an 
 
175 Id. Hypothetically, an investor could invest $0.25 or larger dollar amounts 
offered by issuers. Most deals have larger entry points for investment. For example, 
although a share may cost $0.25 per share, a minimum contribution might be 100 
shares, resulting in a $25 investment. 
176 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012). See also 
Regulation Crowdfunding Release Nos. 33-9974, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2018). 
177 Business fundamentals might include: due diligence regarding the proof of 
concept, a viable business plan, the leadership and human resources, the finances 
and profitability, the product/service, promotion, and the place. 
178  Form C, supra note 12.  
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economic downturn, political events, and technological 
developments (such as hacking and the ability or inability to 
prevent hacking).179  Enhanced risks for early-stage companies 
that are greater than the typical risk of a startup, are another 
cause for concern.180 
There are a variety of other types of information that are 
retrievable from the data, including geographical data, choice of 
entity, and principal office locations.  Only a brief summary of 
the data concerning geographic location of all investment 
crowdfunding transactions is included in this Article.  The scope 
of the geographical investment crowdfunding data may have 
broader implications regarding the reasons why capital blackouts 
in certain areas around the country are occurring.  Also, 
jurisdiction and principal office location is a robust topic, which 
also can be covered in a broader research paper. 
c. Company Choice of Entity and Principal Offices 
This research study did not retrieve incorporation or 
organizational documents.  However, what is apparent from the 
Form C notice filings is that a larger concentration of companies 
selected Delaware as the preferred choice of entity than in 
2016.181  Choice of entity provides context to the law applying to 
“the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible charter and 
bylaw terms, and shareholder voting rights,” which are 
considerations “controlled by the law of the state of incorporation, 
regardless of whether the corporation has any real economic ties 
to that location.”182  Empirical work on choice of entity also can 
“illuminate how parties actually behave” and how the “parties 
 
179 See, e.g., Mobile Spike, Form C Disclosure Questionnaire (Form C) (May 17, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674319/000167431916000003/mob 
ilespikeformc.pdf.  
180 See Patrick McCarney, Note, False Start: Carving a Niche for Established 
Small Business Participation in Regulation Crowdfunding Rules Designed for 
Startups, 51 IND. L. REV. 277, 296 (2018). 
181 See infra Part I.C. More research would be needed to determine the reasons 
for this flight to Delaware. It could be a function of larger deals, herd behavior, or 
other legal, business, and tax considerations. See also Magnuson, supra note 171, at 
178 (explaining reasons for herd behavior in FinTech markets). “This may occur in 
several different ways, but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs 
sharing certain programming templates. If an algorithm proves successful in the 
market, other actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate the algorithm.” Id. 
182 Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses 
in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 597 (2016). 
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would be likely to behave in response to legal rules.”183  Professor 
Cherry notes that corporations engage in races to the bottom, not 
only in selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern 
their internal corporate affairs, but in labor and regulatory 
considerations as well.184 
In the context of digital coin disputes, choice of entity will 
likely be an important jurisdictional question.  Recently, the 
United States  Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan v. Beaver 
County Employees Retirement Fund, permitted some claims 
under the 1933 Act to be brought in state courts (as well as 
federal courts).185  The private bar has predicted that there will 
be a surge in state court actions asserting that ICOs contain 
materially false information.186  A federal judge in the Northern 
District of California recently cited Cyan.187  These decisions 
provide state courts with some precedent to proceed on a variety 
of claims brought by civil litigators, including claims under Rule 
10b-5.188  Companies offering securities under Reg. CF are not 
exempt from these securities law provisions, even though the 
transactions are smaller in size.  Consequently, there is a 
growing preference toward a Delaware incorporation.  Last, the 
Reg. CF offerings are mostly concentrated as common stock, 
simple agreements for equity, and convertible debt offerings, 
with an emerging trend in digital tokens. 
 
183 Kyle Chen et al., Empirical Study Redux on Choice of Law and Forum in 
M&A: The Data and its Limits, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 31–32 (2016). 
184 Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 960–61 
(2011). 
185 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018). 
186 Nicolas Morgan et al., ICO Battlefields Proliferate: Preparing for Private 
Litigation and Regulation Now, THE RECORDER (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/04/27/ico-battlefields-proliferate-preparing-
for-private-litigation-and-regulation-now/?slreturn=20180813122201 (noting the role 
of the private bar to “flesh out the application of long-standing legal concepts to the 
novel issues raised”). See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Wildes v. Bitconnect 
International PLC, No. 18-cv-80086-DMM, 2018 WL 4864836  (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 
2018). 
187 Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, No. 17-cv-06850-RS, 2018 WL 656012 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). 
188 Morgan et. al, supra note 186, at 4 (“[T]he Cyan ruling not only gives 
plaintiffs a choice of forums in Securities Act claims, but potentially allows for 
multiple concurrent actions regarding the same ICO—an outcome that not only 
leads to the potential of inconsistent rulings, but certainly will increase the cost of 
defending this type of litigation.”). 
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d. Investment Crowdfunding Generally 
Studying the Reg. CF parties, funding portals, and offerings, 
provides a better understanding of whether the normative goals 
set forth by the Crowdfund Act have been attained.  When we 
consider what the data means, the conversation quickly becomes 
normative.  Is Reg. CF the best way for companies to form 
capital?  Is there a better way to create jobs than this current 
investment crowdfunding framework?  To the extent the data 
defies our thinking about what is happening in investment 
crowdfunding markets, without more research, we will not be 
able to know for sure whether the positive story is as good as it 
gets, because these small companies could not raise any more 
money than they did under Reg. CF.  Alternatively, is the 
negative story (i.e. not raising more capital through Reg. CF) 
merely the flip side of a positive story because companies not 
using Reg. CF found other alternative financing opportunities to 
their capital needs? 
The next Section provides additional details about the data. 
C. Shedding Light on Data 
There appears to be a limited benefit in Reg. CF offerings, 
which is illustrated in the next Section.  What we know is that 
investors have historically been able to invest in large 
enterprises and those investments have produced both social and 
economic benefits (and losses) for the companies and the 
shareholders.  That data is highlighted daily with disclosures to 
the SEC, and articles in the Wall Street Journal, New York 
Times, Forbes, and Barron’s.  Further, what we also know is that 
accredited and sophisticated investors have been able to invest in 
companies that file under a variety of safe harbor exemptions 
and under the 1933 Act but startups still have trouble raising 
capital.  Companies that have these investors available to them 
could tap into other safe harbor exemptions and file under Reg. A 
or Reg. D. 
Consequently, it appears that the major benefit of Reg. CF 
investment crowdfunding is to provide a place where companies 
can reach into the general public of unsophisticated or 
unaccredited investors.  If these companies had access to 
sophisticated or accredited investors, they likely would file under 
another safe harbor exemption.  The fact that the general public 
is solicited is one reason that regulators should evaluate what is 
actually being offered to investors.   
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1. Quantum Thought? 
There is quantitative data and then there is the meaning 
that we assert about the data.  After reviewing the data, Nick 
Szabo’s idea to simultaneously consider mutually contradictory 
possibilities allows for skepticism in analyzing the data.  Szabo 
states: 
[Q]uantum thought, as I call it—although it already has a 
traditional name less recognizable to the modern ear,  scholastic 
thought—demands that we simultaneously consider often 
mutually contradictory possibilities.189 
The next portion of this Article sets forth the data of the 
study.  The terms that apply to them might vary depending on 
the party interpreting the data.  Is the idea that over $600 
million was offered under Reg. CF a cause to celebrate or does it 
show that Reg. CF offerings pale in comparison to the broader 
ICO or IPO markets?  When we look at the growth progression of 
digital tokens, we could hypothesize that there is a 500% growth 
in digital token offerings, year over year.  Yet, the total aggregate 
numbers of digital token offerings remain small in comparison to 
investment crowdfunding generally or the larger ICOs.  The 
same reasoning could be applied to the data that relates to the 
progress of funding portals throughout the country.  Arguably, 
more funding portals are developing across the nation.  However, 
there are pockets where there are no funding portals and some 
funding portals primarily offer digital tokens, which may or may 
not be the best investment for unsophisticated investors.  Thus, 
normative claims about what is happening are reserved for more 
study and a better understanding that will come with time. 






189 Nick Szabo, More Short Takes, UNENUMERATED (July 1, 2012, 10:47 PM),  
http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2012/07/more-short-takes.html. Tom Robertshaw 
states that to practice quantum thought, one is reminded that “no matter how 
confident we are, we should be the first to question our own point of view” and 
affirming statements of Nick Szabo, “we can be both for and against a proposition 
because we can be ‘considering at least two significantly possible but inconsistent 
hypotheses, or because we favour some parts of a set of ideas but not others.’ ” 
Practicing Quantum Thought, TOM ROBERTSHAW (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://tomrobertshaw.net/2017/08/practicing-quantum-thought/.  
874 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:833   
FINDING A1: ESTIMATED $600 MILLION INVESTMENT 
CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS 2016-2018 

















May-Dec 2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June 2017 - $131.6 Million; 
July-Dec 2017 - $173.36 Million; Jan-June 2018 - $215.5 Million  
 
FINDING A2: GROWTH PROGRESSION NOTED IN 2017 
Chart 2 – Investment Crowdfunding Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth 
Progression 
 
May-Dec 2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June 2017 - $131.6 Million; 
July-Dec 2017 - $173.36 Million; Jan-June 2018 - $215.5 Million  
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FINDING A3: BY 2018, DELAWARE AS CHOICE OF 
ENTITY PREFERRED 
Chart 3 –  2018 Company Choice of Entity compared to 2016 

















FINDING A4: DELAWARE PREFERRED AS THE 
CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS 














876 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:833   
2. From SAFE to Blockchain-Based Digital Tokens 
In this section, we explore how digital tokens have been 
characterized in the Reg. CF offerings between 2016 and 2018 
and the scope of the offerings. 
Companies included over $22 million of Reg. CF securities 
offerings with tokens in investment crowdfunding offerings 
beginning in November 2017 through June 2018.  These new 
digital token investment contracts have increased by 500% 
starting in 2017 to 2018.  Considering there were no Reg. CF 
digital tokens in 2016, they have increased 2000% since 2016. 
It is important to note that the vast number of digital tokens 
offered throughout the United States are not offered under Reg. 
CF.  There is a larger spectrum of all Reg. CF campaigns, in 
comparison to ICO campaigns.  Reg. CF digital token 
transactions remain a small, albeit important, slice of capital 
raising.  To better understand this point, it is best to view the 
spectrum graphically.  Between 2016 and 2018, companies 
sought to raise over $615 million under Reg. CF—of that amount, 
$22.2 million related to digital tokens.  Estimates graphically 
illustrate that digital tokens currently are less than 3% of total 
Reg. CF offerings. 
a. Growth of Digital Tokens in Reg. CF 
FINDING B1: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL 
IN COMPARISON TO ALL REG. CF INVESTMENT 
CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS 
Chart 5 – All Reg. CF Offerings, $615 Million; Digital Token 
Offerings, $22.2 Million; and All Other Reg. CF Campaigns  











Also, to understand the context of Reg. CF digital token 
offerings in comparison to ICOs, the next graph illustrates that 
the aggregate dollar amount of Reg. CF digital token offerings is 
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exceedingly small compared to the aggregate dollar amount of 
ICO offerings.  In fact, Reg. CF digital tokens, representing over 
$22 million in offerings, are less than .2% of total coin offerings. 
 
FINDING B2: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL 
IN COMPARISON TO ICO OFFERINGS OF 
 $11.3 BILLION 
Chart 6 –  Composite of estimated coin offerings, including ICO’s 
($11.3 Billion), All Reg. CF offerings ($620 Million) of which 




Considering this context, digital token offerings under Reg. 
CF could be considered small in comparison to the movement 
currently happening with ICOs.  These small digital tokens are 
providing early-stage companies capital to launch later stage 
transactions. 
During the first half of 2018, over $16.9 million of securities 
were offered with digital assets tied to blockchain, otherwise 
described as Reg. CF digital tokens.  For the six-month period in 
2018, there is a developing second phase of investment contracts.  
In the first phase, investment crowdfunding transactions 
included SAFEs and revenue-sharing instruments,190 giving 
investors the right to future shares in a company.  However, the 
company may never receive a future equity financing or elect to 
convert the securities upon such future financing.  In addition, 
the company may never undergo a liquidity event such as a sale 
of the company or an IPO.  If neither the conversion of the 
 
190 See Wroldsen, supra, note 6, at 555, 569–70, 573–76 (discussing the offering 
of revenue-sharing and SAFE instruments under Reg. CF); see also Heminway, 
supra note 13, at 7. 
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securities nor a liquidity event occurs, the purchasers could be 
left holding the securities in perpetuity as long as the company is 
in business.  The securities have numerous transfer restrictions 
and will likely be highly illiquid, with no secondary market in 
which to sell them.  The securities are not equity interests, have 
no ownership rights, have no rights to the company’s assets or 
profits, and have no voting rights or ability to direct the company 
or its actions.  If someone invests, he or she is betting that the 
company will be worth more in the future. 
It should be noted that many offerings are still in progress.  
In Chart 7, the Author provides data as to the date and 
maximum amount of the offering; the capital raised as of 
November 30, 2018, the name of the company and the digital 
token offered; and the company principal office location and the 
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FINDING B3: DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS 
GROWING MORE RAPIDLY IN 2018 
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191 This listing of information does not include debt offerings of companies that 
are not offering tokens in the original offer. See, e.g., Blockstack Token, LLC offering 
$1.07 million on March 1, 2018 to raise capital with a debt offering; a target of $200k 
at $1 price. Reg. CF Form C. Also, Unicoin Blockchain Inc., which is offering class B 
non-voting common stock at $10 per share, with a minimum target offering of 
$10,000 and a maximum offering of $80,000. Additional information regarding the 
actual capital raised was retrieved from the Startengine website for Indeco, Indeco: 
Offering a Crypto Asset That Fuels a Cleaner Economy, STARTENGINE,  
https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Feb. 21, 2018), and Witnet. See 
Witnet, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
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$1,070,000 10,866.00 n/a 
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In 2018, most of the companies that raised capital by offering 
digital tokens were primarily tech-related startup companies.  
The type of tech-startups varied by the target clients, goods, or 
service markets.  For example, most of the companies identified 
as funding portals or technology businesses seeking to develop 
blockchain networks; six companies broadly identified as tech 
companies with health, consumer health registry, or biotech 
applications; one company was developing a platform for 
cannabis sales; two developed web based marketing services; one 
a jewelry product; tech insurance services; and another a tech 
security company. 
By contrast, during 2017, only four companies offered digital 
tokens in offerings.  The types of companies varied, from medical 
records to sports (football), renewable energy, and solar energy 
startups.  All four 2017 offerings included investment contracts 
and, in each case, a SAFT.  Additionally, each of the four digital 
token offerings is tied to the development of a blockchain 
distributed ledger. 
 
FINDING B4: DIGITAL TOKENS REPRESENTED 
FOUR OFFERINGS IN 2017 















SAFT: Mission: To use 
blockchain technology to 
establish a better, more 
secure and transparent 
framework for Electronic 
Medical Record that vastly 
improves the quality of care 
for patients and helps 







SAFT: Fanchise Tokens 
Mission: Built on the 
Blockchain and designed to 
combine the passion of live 
sport, the competition of 
fantasy sports, the 
engagement of video games, 
and the global reach of 
esports, the FCFL is the 
first pro sports league truly 
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$1,070,000 $106,450 
SAFT: Mission: a real-world 
company building revenue 
generating renewable 
energy assets that is also 
developing an Ethereum-
based blockchain currency 
platform. With the ability to 
implement smart contracts 
on a distributed ledger, the 
Sun Fund token will bring 
liquidity and a store of 
value for renewable energy 
assets while also helping to 
disintermediate global 









Filed a Form 




SAFT: Indecoin Tokens 
Mission: To be astable 
crypto assetfor stored value, 
aninvestment vehicleand an 
engine forthe expansion of 
the clean economy, 
including solar energy, 
battery storage and smart 
controls and sensors for 
energy efficiency.Our 
network will support four 












b. Growth Compared to Other Capital Formation 
FINDING B5: COMPARISON OF DIGITAL TOKENS 
FROM 2017 TO 2018 
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The locations of the principal offices of companies offering 
securities under Reg. CF are set forth below.  The principal 
locations are western states, such as  California, Nevada, 
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Oregon.  The next 
grouping is companies with principal locations in Delaware, New 
York, Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina, and 
Mississippi.  This research project does not address the reasons 
why there is not participation in digital tokens by companies in 
states outside of coastal areas. 
 
 
FINDING B6: PRINCIPAL OFFICE LOCATIONS ARE 
PRIMARILY LOCATED IN CALIFORNIA; THEN 
DELAWARE, NEVADA AND NEW YORK 
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FINDING B7: GROWTH PROGRESSION OF DIGITAL 
TOKENS IS ACCELERATING IN LATE 2017 
THROUGHOUT 2018 
















Chart: Zero campaigns in 2016; four campaigns in 2017; 
twenty campaign2018.  
3. Funding Portal Intermediation Findings 
One of the requirements of Reg. CF is that companies use a 
funding portal to host the offering.  The role of the funding portal 
is best described in Werbach’s description of an intermediary: 
 
What makes activity happen in this arrangement is the 
intermediaries’ ability to aggregate activity on both sides.  
Financial services relationships are a good example of 
intermediary trust.  Commercial banks sit in the middle of the 
transaction flow between depositors and borrowers...Investment 








192 WERBACH, supra note 18, at 28. 
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FINDING C1: REGISTERED FUNDING PORTALS  
EXPANDED ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
 
As of July 11, 2018, there were forty-three funding portals 
registered to serve in that role for the companies offering 
securities under Reg. CF.  These entities served the 
crowdfunding market by providing structure for the transactions 
over the past three years. 
The chart below provides a listing of the top five funding 
portals completing a majority of all of the investment 
crowdfunding transactions for this period.  There are two notable 
inferences from this data.  First, StartEngine Capital, LLC is 
doing the lion’s share of the investment crowdfunding offerings, 
which suggests that this particular funding portal has an 
effective system for raising capital.  Second, the number of 
overall funding portals is increasing, but fewer funding portals 
are conducting more offerings. 
 
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS CONSOLIDATED 
OFFERINGS AND MORE FUNDING  
PORTALS REGISTERED 











During the prior six-month period from January to June 
2017, StartEngine Capital, LLC, WeFunder, and SI Securities, 
LLC were the three leading funding portals for investment 
crowdfunding offerings.  Next, First Democracy VC and 
OpenDeal, LLC also performed a number of transactions.  From 
January to June 2017, the same five funding portals hosted 
offerings. 
The principal funding portals that assist companies with 
digital token offerings are Start Engine Capital, LLC, Open Deal, 
Inc. d/b/a Republic, First Democracy VC, and truCrowd, Inc.  The 
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chart below illustrates just how many more offerings 
StartEngine Capital, LLC is conducting compared to other 
funding portals in the digital token space.  Also, the chart 
illustrates where most of the digital token offerings are hosted 
and the pace at which they grew from 2017 to 2018.  The funding 
portal, StartEngine Capital, LLC is substantially greater than 
any other funding portal, which calls into question the scope and 
growth of Reg. CF digital tokens in investment crowdfunding. 
 
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS ACCELERATING 
BUT CONCENTRATION IN FOUR FUNDING  
PORTALS IN 2018 
Chart 13 – 2017 - 2018 Funding Portals By # of Offerings for Reg. 
CF digital tokens 
 
 
4. Terms and Conditions of Offerings 
As might be expected in different industries, the descriptions 
of SAFTs or other digital token investments can vary 
significantly.  For example, in the Fanchise Sports League, Inc. 
digital token offering, the company provides its investors the 
right to vote on games and provides an opportunity to participate 
in a $1 million purse on football team winnings, based on the 
number of digital tokens that the investor owned, however, this 
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Reg. C-W offering was withdrawn.193  This right to vote on games 
is unique to this particular transaction as it engages the investor 
in the company’s games and allows them to potentially win when 
their team wins.  Another company, MedChain, would allow its 
utility tokens to be “used within the network to purchase entry 
credits facilitating Electronic Medical Record storage and access 
control.”194 
The right to actually receive a digital token or some other 
non-security utility token varies by the offering.  Most of the 
2018 companies discuss the right to receive a future utility token, 
contingent upon the company’s creation of a network based upon 
blockchain and distributed ledger technology.195  Or companies 
include other language, such as, “the right to receive future 
utility tokens when and if the company creates a network based 
upon blockchain and distributed ledger technology.”196  In some 
offerings, the investors are allowed to choose whether they 
receive back cash or a “possible” digital token.  Some companies 
state that only they will decide whether the investor receives 
digital tokens, common stock, or other cash payment. 
Voting rights also vary across transactions.  In most 
transactions, the investor does not have voting rights in company 
decisions.  However, there are various decisions on which an 
investor could vote, such as what new promotional events the 
company could have.  For example,when Fanchise League 
discusses the FAN Token Ecosystem, it states “[t]he Fan Access 
Network and FAN Tokens are going to revolutionize the 
experience of being a sports fan, and the FCFL will be the first 
league built on and powered by the Fan Access Network.”197 
 
193 Fanchise League, LLC Form C filed November 12, 2017 and Form C-W filed 
April 30, 2018. Fanchise Sports League, Inc. also hosted a crowdfunding campaign 
on Indiegogo which surpassed their $5 million ask by December 23, 2017. See FCFL, 
https://medium.com/@FCFLio/fan-token-pre-sale-update-we-exceeded-our-goal-8559 
ae2491b7 (last visited on April 8, 2019) (“Ten-day campaign was the first token sale 
ever hosted by crowdfunding leader Indiegogo (in conjunction with MicroVentures) 
and garnered attention from the likes of the New York Times, Forbes, 
and CoinDesk.”). These offerings were to be followed up with a public digital token 
sale for fans looking to gain early access to voting power in March or early April of 
2018. See Fan Token Blog, http://blog.fantoken.network/frequenty/ (Dec. 28, 2017). 
194 See MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last 
visited on Feb. 21, 2019) (describing their SAFT offering). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 The Fan Token Ecosystem, FCFL BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://blog.fantoken.network/fan-token-ecosystem/. 
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FINDING C3: TERMS OF DIGITAL TOKEN 
OFFERINGS HAVE VARIOUS TERMS 
Chart 14 – Terms and Conditions of Digital Token Offerings 
RIGHTS TO TOKENS Right to receive future utility tokens based 
on an uncertain future event (e.g. blockchain 
and distributed ledger technology) 
 
CONTINGENCY Based upon the successful development of 
Tokens, the company creates a network 
based on the blockchain upon which the 
Tokens function. 
TIMING Uncertain 
EVENT Optional, not guaranteed 
VOTING RIGHTS Tied to decisions of the company or decisions 
related to other promotions and events of 
the company; 
Right to Vote on Games 
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS The right to participate in purses and team 
winnings, based on number of Tokens 
investor owns 






On wallets on open source and/or future 
tradeable exchanges 
TIED TO OTHER 
SECURITIES 
Common or Debt plus Tokens 
REPAYMENT In Tokens, Cash, Common Stock 
REPAYMENT OPTION 
DECISION TO RECEIVE 
CASH OR TOKENS 
 
Investor or the company 
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II. CONCERNS WITH DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS 
A. What is Troubling About Digital Token Offerings? 
Investment crowdfunding company offerings include a range 
of common stock, convertible debt, tokens and coins offered to 
investors.  The data infers that investment crowdfunding 
offerings have led to mixed results and some troubling 
developments.  On the positive side, this research supports the 
assertion that investment crowdfunding has had momentum, 
even though still in its infancy.  There is greater breadth in 
publicly offered crowdfunding campaigns.  Those campaigns can 
be measured by the increasing numbers of company principal 
office locations throughout the country, increasing amounts and 
types of securities offerings, and an increasing variety of 
companies that are participating.  These amounts represent a 
sizable expansion in investment crowdfunding under Reg. CF.  
The next Section discusses the troubling concerns with digital 
token offerings, which include uncertainty and risk, cancelled 
offerings, and goals of Reg. CF that have yet to be attained. 
1. Uncertainty and Risk 
The more troubling discovery from this research is the 
accelerating movement of companies offering Reg. CF blockchain-
based tokens to investors.  These investment contracts include a 
possible conversion to a token or coin that is distributable upon 
the success of blockchain ledger technology.  The greatest 
concern is the uncertainty of blockchain technology.  To the 
extent that companies are raising funds based on that success, 
the likelihood of raising the necessary funds becomes more 
speculative.  Investment contracts with token conversions are 
written such that risk is a given and that there is no guarantee 
the services or tokens will ever come to fruition. 
The Form C/A’s, C-U’s and C-W’s provide a picture of 
companies that may be having difficulty raising capital on the 
funding portal.  Form C-U allows a company to extend the time 
that it can seek funding.198  The first of the negative results 




198 Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 5. 
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When raising capital, businesses must fulfill their business 
needs as well as stay apprised of changing regulations in order to 
protect their investors and reduce legal liability.  To the extent 
that businesses successfully raise capital, but fail to appreciate 
shareholder interests or potential liability, business losses and 
securities and fiduciary liability can become real concerns.  A 
good example of this balancing is the case of Indeco Financial 
Syndicate, Inc., which touts itself as one of the first companies to 
file a registration for tokens under Reg. CF.199  On the same day 
as the Indeco Reg. CF filing, the SEC froze the assets of another 
company based in Quebec that had raised $15 million but failed 
to register their token offering.200 
An example of a more successful fundraising campaign is 
Witnet Foundation, a Delaware company with a principal office 
in the state of Washington.  Witnet raised $1,069,983 from 688 
investors by March 2018.201  One difference in this company’s 
offering from typical Reg. CF and other securities offerings is 
that instead of the company repaying its debt obligation with 
cash, the company plans to repay the obligation with Wit tokens 
and 20% interest.202 
As Witnet and Indeco suggest, companies face a variety of 
dilemmas in raising capital.  On the one hand, a company seeks 
to maintain a sustainable business venture.  To do that requires 
a basic accountability to their business plan while not being blind 
to new innovation.  A company must always perform the 
necessary compliance in order to avoid state or federal regulatory 
discipline.  Innovation is believed to be the main driver of long-
term economic growth in the United States.203  But innovation 
includes uncertainty, which in turn, presents the dilemma for a 
company in considering what possibly could go wrong.  To that 
end, a best practice would be to think of what could go wrong and 
plan to minimize potential liabilities.  However, minimizing 
 
199 Indeco, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Feb. 
21, 2019) (Indeco CEO David Levine is interviewed by Peter Armstrong on the CBC 
show, “On the Money”); see also Press Release, Indeco, Indeco Launches First Token 
Pre-sale under SEC’s Regulation Crowdfunding Rules (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-
regulation-crowdfunding-rules-e82dad79345. 
200 See DAO Report, supra note 116, at 16; Levine, supra note 156. 
201 Witnet, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
202 Id. 
203 Brian Kingsley Krumm, Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Shark 
Tank Shouldn’t Be the Model, 70 ARK. L. REV. 553, 555 (2017). 
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liabilities may require not always giving the most valued 
investors exactly what they may demand.  Thus, the dilemma 
hinges on how to harness investor satisfaction in an ever 
technologically advancing society.   
In Reg. CF capital formation, the ecosystem includes the 
companies, the funding portals mandated by the SEC to be used 
in these offerings, the employees, and the crowd.  Companies 
raising capital via Reg. CF are required to be assisted by funding 
portals in their first steps towards “going public.”  The SEC 
requires that funding portals follow a variety of rules or be 
subject to § 5(c) of the Securities Act and sections of the 
Securities Exchange Act.204  Funding portals have additional 
legal exposure and must make sure to comply with their own 
registration requirements.205  To date, companies with token 
offerings have been assisted by only four funding portals, while 
overall, there were forty-three funding portals registered.   
 Companies that use Reg. CF have employees.  As creating 
jobs for employees is one of the normative goals of investment 
crowdfunding, over the past two years, companies have disclosed 
the hiring of over 5,300 employees, on average.  The number is 
smaller for companies engaging in token offerings, with an 
average of 149 employees.  The investors are also essential to this 
ecosystem.  Their particular interest in purchasing coin-based 
securities/currencies may also be driving the demand for these 
products. The good news about Reg. CF is that the current 
financial movement drives an ecosystem for businesses to raise 
funds, and hire employees. The downside is that the token frenzy 
may wane, which may lead to unemployment in the long term. 
 There are risks to investors also.  Worst case, investors will 
be left with shiny coins to satisfy the obligations and the 
companies would be left to ward off future disputes.  
 
204 See SEC v. Muehler, No. 2:18-cv-01677-CAS(SKx), 2018 WL 1665637, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. 2018) (granting the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the 
defendant in a case “assert[ing] claims against defendants for (1) violations of 
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) . . . for (2) violations of 
Sections 10(b), 15(a), and 20(e) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) . . . 78t . . . and for (3) violations of Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5”). 
205 The SEC must demonstrate a prima facie case that defendants have violated 
§ 5(c) of the Securities Act. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act makes it “unlawful for 
any person . . . to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy 
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a 
registration statement has been filed . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). 
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 One solution to enhanced risk and potential investor 
dissatisfaction is to provide robust and clear offering disclosures.  
Although difficult to do when funding is needed, companies must 
recognize that due diligence requires a long-term view, which 
includes paying close attention to funding that has a low 
probability of repayment.  Further, state and federal securities 
agencies can be helpful by providing clarity on the allowance or 
disallowance of certain types of securities.  Tokens are just the 
latest development in a type of security or reward offered.  We 
can only imagine the outer limits of virtual securities to come. 
One difference in Reg. CF digital tokens is that there are 
notice filings with the SEC.  Because of that fact, token-funded 
companies are likely to be more cautious than companies that 
either are not registering because they do not think they are 
offering a security, or because they are trying to circumvent the 
law.  This difference may play out with fewer matters involving 
fraud, manipulation, and deception, than may be found with 
unregistered ICOs. 
However, what is more troubling is the complexity of the 
offerings and the open question of whether these investors have a 
basic understanding of what they are buying.  This part of the 
story will continue to unfold as companies provide disclosures to 
their buyers as time goes on.  With respect to companies, the 
warning signs are present.  There is volatility in current 
blockchain-based transactions that are currently trading.  If the 
company succeeds, then they not only have successfully raised 
capital, but will also have potentially happy investors.  To the 
extent that the company does not meet its mission of successfully 
creating a token utility, commodity, or security, and the token 
fails to meet the goals of the offering, then those companies 
would be best served by thinking about the alternative plan to 
the failure of the offering, which makes Professor Heminway’s 
assertion so relevant here.206  As we are in an age of alternative 
entities, alternative finance, and alternative facts, it behooves 
companies, their advisors, investors, and the agencies that have 
oversight over these transactions, to think long and hard about 
the responsibility we have to each other and to ourselves. 
 
 
206 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professional Responsibility in an Age of 
Alternative Entities, Alternative Finance, and Alternative Facts, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 
227, 256, 259 (2017). 
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Should we be troubled by the development that Reg. CF is 
being used for pre-coin token offerings as a leverage to other coin 
offerings?207  Rather than failing to register, companies are 
engaging in digital token transactions that are exempt from 
registration in light of the regulatory uncertainty.  This part is 
understandable as a company would want to avoid securities 
liability and unintended consequences.208  But the Reg. CF 
offering may be just a means to another larger digital token 
offering end.  Arguably, that leverage is a good thing. 
The greater inclusion of pre-token/coin conversions raises 
long-term sustainability concerns for companies and long-term 
viability concerns for investors.  The existence of digital token 
offerings under Reg. CF—albeit small in number and relatively 
insubstantial in dollar value as compared to the total number of 
Reg. CF offerings and the total number of ICOs—raises many 
questions for companies and investors.  What are the 
considerations for companies in choosing Reg. CF digital tokens 
and how should investors respond?  To the extent that companies 
are relying on the § 4(a)(6) exemption from registration, should 
these types of coin offerings and sweeteners be registered as 
ICOs?  What limits should the SEC set to protect the crowd from 
bearing the brunt of the risk of valueless cryptocurrency 
 
207 See DAO Report, supra note 116. The SEC recently investigated The DAO 
organization, which sold DAO tokens to fund investments. Id. The founders 
described it as a "crowdfunding contract" to raise funds to create a company in 
crypto space. Id. at 4. The press release notes that although crowdfunding was used 
to describe the design, it would not qualify for an exception under Regulation 
Crowdfunding because the platform or organization was not registered as “a broker-
dealer or a funding portal.” Id. at 4 n.11. 
208 There are very few cases/matters relating to investment crowdfunding 
company violations or controversies. However, Allen Hydro Electric Corporation 
related to the offering of debt securities through “an online equity crowdfunding 
website.” In re Allen Hydro Energy Corp., No. 17-028, 2017 WL 4325088 at *1 (Ohio 
Dept. Commerce 2017). The Ohio Department of Commerce found that the 
Corporation had several violations of Reg. CF. Id. at *1–*4. The violations in the 
Consent Agreement included: a failure to follow the disclosure requirements; Allen 
Hydro Electric’s “[b]usiness [p]lan did not have a reasonable basis in fact”; and they 
failed to follow proper procedures. Id. at *2. In light of these violations, Respondent’s 
crowdfunding attempt did not qualify for the crowdfunding exemption. See id. at *3. 
Additionally, the SEC issued several Comment Letters to Worthpoint Corporation 
and Sagoon, Inc. See generally Letter from Jeanne Campanelli, Partner, KHLK LLP, 
to Barbara C. Jacobs, Assistant Director, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 
23, 2016) (SEC digital archives). The SEC noticed there was an offer to exchange 
common stock purchased under Reg. CF for other shares. See id. Both companies 
stated that it was to "grant those shareholders the greater informational rights and 
ability to freely resell their shares that Regulation A provides, and place all the 
company's shareholders on an equal footing." Id. 
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repayments or convertible instruments that may never convert to 
equity or anything of value?  Will the SEC abdicate authority to 
the extent that companies disclose that risk of loss to the 
investing crowd is great or will they intervene to set parameters 
on this new blockchain-based token movement?  It is predictable 
that if businesses fail, investors will feel taken advantage of, thus 
creating heightened legal risk for companies.209 
2. Inadequate Disclosures 
Another negative indicator in the Reg. CF crowdfunding data 
is that the disclosures may comply with the requirements of 
securities law, but still fail the investors.210  The reasons may 
have to do with the inability to portray through disclosure the 
level of risk that is involved in investing in the particular 
company.211  This is even truer in the case of blockchain-based 
token offerings under Reg. CF.212  Most governmental agencies 
have a difficult time explaining the risks for purchasing a 
blockchain-based token, let alone a startup company working 
with a group of advisors, funding portals, and employees new to 
this technology.213  Most unsophisticated investors would not 
likely have the background to understand the terms of these 
offerings.214  Even though the disclosures may appear adequate, 
it seems unlikely that investors would understand whether it is 
likely or unlikely that they will ever receive a digital token and 
whether the company is able to implement its version of smart 
contracts on the blockchain.215  This leads to the third negative 
indicator, which relates to where those disclosures, or lack 
thereof, leave unsophisticated investors. 
 
209 Two questions, not addressed in this Article, relate to the uncertainty of 
blockchain’s success as most of the ICO or Reg. CF offerings are tied to the 
blockchain. Further, the strength or flaws of the company’s business model are also 
important. 
210 See Hinman, supra note 3. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: 
Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 604 (2013). 
214 See id. at 605. 
215 See id. 
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3. Investors in Limbo 
Before the recent crash of coins, it may have been difficult 
for investors to think clearly with so many varying reports of coin 
purchasers profiting in large amounts.216  It sounds good, but 
investors should understand the distinctions between companies, 
services, offerings, timetables, and terms and conditions, because 
these terms can have an adverse effect on them.  The worst case 
is that an investor spends hard-earned cash on a company’s 
capital campaign and loses her money.  The likely case is that an 
investor will be left in limbo wondering whether the company’s 
goods or services will ever allow for a token to be issued and 
exchanged on some future distributed ledger.217 
An illustration of investors in limbo is evident in frequent 
postings by investors who purchased Indeco Dusto digital tokens.  
Several months after Indeco exceeded its minimum capital 
request, raising over $171,000, investors began to ask about the 
progress of the development of the digital tokens and the 
blockchain.  Below are the string of posts (as included on the 
StartEngine website) between a frustrated investor and the 
company on the StartEngine funding portal website on 
November 30, 2018:218 
Potential Investor, 6 months ago 
Still no peep. The writing seems to be on the wall and yet I saw 
Indeco continues to sell the theoretical tokens at a discount on 
other forums. I should have known better.219 
Around a month later, a company representative responds: 
Indeco – Issuer, 6 months ago 
Hi [Potential Investor]—we’ve been focusing on building out the 
platform and qualifying for our Security Token Offering with the 
SEC. It’s a brutal process. 
 
Now that we’re solidly in business, with revenue and technology 
(no longer a theoretical company), I’ll be in closer touch. 
 
You should have my personal email address as I’ve sent notes to 
all investors in the past. Feel free to contact me directly. Happy 
to give investors my cell # as well. 
 
216 Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 506-07. 
217 Id. at 507–08. 
218 Indeco, Comments, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
219 Id. 
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When we pull off the STO, you’ll be glad you invested. :)  
 
David220 
A couple of months later, the Investor inquires again: 
Potential Investor, 3 months ago 
Have not have [sic] much communication other than the post 
below related to the status of the SAFT investment. The March 
2019 deadline is coming up where are [sic] SAFTs could 
potentially become worthless. Is the company on track to issue 
tokens soon or before the deadline? The lack of communication 
and updates makes it seem as if the company is waiting until the 
expiration date so that the SAFTs expire worthless. I have 
reached out many times on the Indeco website and through this 
platform asking for updates and have never received a response 
to my e-mails which does not give me confidence in the project 
being successful. I think many SAFT investors would like some 
communication on the status of this investment with the 
expiration date coming up. Also if the expiration date in March 
is reached does the company plan on extending the deadline per 
the provision in the SAFT agreement or will the company let the 
SAFTs expire?221 
 
Potential Investor, 3 months ago 
Is anyone from the company ever going to reply back and give us 
s [sic] recent update? I have reached out through the portal and 
the company web[s]ite numerous times. Starting to think are 
[sic] money is gone... shouldn’t be that hard to get s [sic] response 
from someone.222 
 
Around a month later, a company representative responds: 
Indeco – Issuer 
The SAFTs will not expire. They’ll be converted to tokens.223 
4. Cancelled Offerings 
 Another troubling concern is that not all companies have 
successfully raised funds through these digital token offerings, as 
some have been cancelled.  Some companies fail to raise the 
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extent there is uncertainty about the outcome of digital token 
transactions, the lack of participation could be a good thing for 
the potential investors and possibly the companies.  Not 
investing minimizes or eliminates the higher transaction risk 
based on blockchain technologies. On the other hand, if 
companies can raise capital and grow successful businesses, 
providing needed services and goods to the community, then the 
failure to participate in Reg. CF investment crowdfunding will 
impact the potential economic growth for years to come. 
 Three companies withdrew from their Reg. CF digital token 
offerings during the time period of this Article.  One example is 
Access Network Labs, Inc., a Delaware incorporated company 
located in New York, which launched a token debt asset 
offering.224   Access Network had a noble goal of “[c]reating access 
to financial and technological tools for the word’s [sic] 1.7 billion 
unbanked adults through the development of a sustainable 
decentralized bank.”225  The minimum funding goal was 
$100,000, with a minimum investment of $50 in return for an 
Access Token.226  Their maximum funding goal was to raise $1.07 
million.227  Access Network Labs had a breakdown for the token 
sale: 30% of the tokens were dedicated to growing the branchless 
banking infrastructure and user base; 30% of the tokens were to 
be dedicated to rewarding the development of applications; and 
the remaining were tokens towards the sale (21%); founding 
team (12%); community rewards (3%); and advisors (4%).228  
However, after initially amending the offering, the company 
withdrew the offering on July 27, 2018.229 
 
 
224 Access Network Labs, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739626/000173962618000001/formc.pdf 
(offering Token DPA, Series S-a DPAs (Debt Payable by Assets), 100,000 units at a 
$1.00 price). 
225 Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2019). 
226 Id. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. 
229 EDGAR Search Results, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/c 
gi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=1739626&owner=exclude&action=getcompany (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2019); see also Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019) (showing caption of “Access Network has withdrawn their 
campaign.”). The reason for the withdrawal is not listed on the website. Id. A 
withdrawal could also indicate a retooling or finding capital through another exempt 
or non-exempt offering. 
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 Two other companies withdrew their digital token offerings 
during this period.  Time Token, Inc. had a principal office in 
Arizona and was incorporated in Delaware.230  On May 23, 2018, 
Time Token sought to raise $107,000 for its goal of merging 
blockchain technology with vacation rental real estate, to bring 
liquidity to the vacation rental market.231  Their digital tokens 
were called Preferred Equity Tokens (“PET”).232  However, by 
September 9, 2018, Time Token withdrew its offer to sell PET 
tokens to the general public after raising over $22,000.233  A third 
example was Frtoken, Inc., a company based in New Mexico and 
incorporated in Delaware.234  Frtoken offered a CHIKN Token on 
April 20, 2018 with phrases, to include a decentralized 
blockchain-based platform that allows companies to pay 
audiences directly for watching ads and answering surveys.235   
The CHIKN token represented a single share of Series B 
Common Stock of this company.236  After raising $11,000 of the 
$107,000 maximum funding sought, then filed a Form C-W and 
withdrew the offering on October 1, 2018.237 
 It is also possible that these companies underestimated the 
costs or potential liabilities.  In the case of Frtoken, they raised 
over the minimum ask of $9,000,238 which in this regulatory 
environment, may not have been enough to remain sustainable. 
 It would take additional research to determine why these 
companies were not successful in their crowdfunding campaigns.  
The top four most common reasons that a company fails are that 
there was no market need for their goods or services; they simply 
ran out of money; they didn’t have the right team formed; or they 
lacked the proper competitive advantages to continue with the 
business.239  Timing of offerings is also important, and to the 
extent that the offering does not go well, that may present 
 
230 Time Token, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (May 23, 2018). 
231 Id. 
232 See Time Token, Progress Update (Form C-U) (Aug. 30, 2018).  
233 See id.; see also Time Token, Offering Statement Withdrawal (Form C-W) 
(Sep. 7, 2018). 
234 Frtoken, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (Apr. 20, 2018). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Frtoken, Inc., Offering Statement Withdrawal (Form C-W) (Oct. 1, 2018). 
238 Id. 
239 Triin Linamagi, The Most Common Reasons Startups Fail, FAST COMPANY 
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3044519/7-of-the-most-common-reas 
ons-startups-fail (noting some companies run out of cash before they are able to 
raise the funds). 
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problems for the company.  However, it is also possible that a 
withdrawal could indicate a retooling or landing alternative 
capital from a private source. 
5. Crowdfund Act Goals Yet To Be Attained 
 In light of the research findings, it is highly questionable 
whether the normative goals of the Crowdfund Act have been 
fulfilled.  There is still much work to be done on the two goals of 
encouraging small business growth and furthering employment, 
specifically to “help entrepreneurs raise the capital they need to 
put Americans back to work and create an economy that’s built to 
last.”240  There are two reasons for this concern.  First, 
considering investment crowdfunding’s potential as a 
decentralizing, democratizing tool, that has not happened.241  
With more encouragement and decreased costs, we may see more 
activity.  Second, the rapid growth that is occurring in 
blockchain-based tokens shares similarities with the proliferation 
of unsound mortgages in the 2008 mortgage debacle.  One must 
hope that this trend will turn out differently.  Also, there are 
geographical considerations that have impacts on the future 
success of capital formation.  Some areas of the country are not 
participating in either investment crowdfunding generally, or in 
the more specialized digital token offerings. 
6. Alternative Financing 
 For companies, theoretically, there are a variety of 
financings that would be available for amounts under $1 
million.242  Some of the most common alternative financing 
measures for financing up to $1 million include friend and family 
financing, bank and government loan financing, factoring, and 




240 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama 
to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Companies (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012) 
(https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-
sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act). 
241 Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 466–67. 
242 See DONALD F. KURATKO, ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY, PROCESS, PRACTICE, 
SOURCES OF CAPITAL FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 232 (2008); see also Lee, 
supra note 7, at 68–69. 
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 Friends and family financing is defined as funding from 
members of the business owners’ family and friends who provide 
loans for debt or cash for equity in the company.243  Family and 
friend’s contributions are additional to cash and other 
contributions provided by the owners, themselves (commonly 
called bootstrapping).244  This early stage financing is not 
discussed in this Article, since it is typically provided at the early 
stages of the business and not in this growth cycle of the 
business. 
 Bank and government loans are a traditional way for a 
business to get capital by obtaining a loan from their bank, 
community development organization, small business investment 
company, or other lender.245  The business can also seek a 
guarantee of their loan from the Small Business 
Administration.246 
 “Factoring is the outright purchase of a business’ 
outstanding accounts receivable by a commercial finance 
company or ‘factor’ ” at a rate typically between 70% and 90% of 
the receivable at the time the company purchases it.247 
 Peer to peer lending is a means for a borrower to get a 
cheaper loan than the banks and credit card companies offer 
through a peer to peer network.  “Websites such as Prosper and 
Lending Club . . . function like a bank loan officer, taking loan 
applications, checking credit scores, employment and debt levels.  
These peer to peer networks state that theyreject 90 percent of 
applicants.  Lending Club, for instance, requires a minimum 
FICO score of 660, above the national average credit score of 
690.”248  
 For companies with excellent credit ratings, access to 
accredited and sophisticated investors, or angel networks, other 
alternatives may be available, such as angel investments,  
 
 
243 See Lee, supra note 7, at 50.  
244 Id.; see also JEROME KATZ & RICHARD P. GREEN, III, ENTREPRENEURIAL 
SMALL BUSINESS 500–01 (2014). 
245 Id.  
246 Id.  
247 Tom Klausen, The Difference Between Factoring and Accounts Receivable 
Financing, ALLBUSINESS, http://www.allbusiness.com/the-difference-between-factor 
ing-and-accounts-receivable-financing-14847411-1.html (last visited on Mar. 9, 
2016). 
248 Jim Gallagher, Is Lending to Strangers Smart Investing?, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Jan. 27, 2013), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/is-lending-to-
strangers-smart-investing/article_7f79bb0b-5c6a-5399-a4b3-f352ba8fc877.html. 
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venture capital financing, private placements and initial public 
offerings.  It is unlikely that the companies availing themselves 
of financing under Reg. CF, have these tools available to them. 
B.  Positive Findings 
1. Some Companies’ Successful Offerings  
 A positive outcome of investment crowdfunding was that a 
number of successful offerings occurred during this time period.  
On April 6, 2018, Wellbeing Brewing Company, LLC, a St. Louis 
based company organized in Missouri, conducted a Reg. CF 
crowdfunding offering.249  The company sought to raise a 
minimum of $125,000 up to a maximum of $200,000 and provide 
investors convertible notes paying 6% interest, which would be 
payable by April 6, 2023.250  The company’s goal is to create a 
healthy craft beer for customers who do not drink alcohol.251  This 
novel customer product was well received by investors, which 
allowed Wellbeing to raise $199,000 from seventy investors and 
successfully close their offering within three months’ time.252  
Wellbeing conducted its offering via Nvsted.253  Nvsted is a St. 
Louis Regional Economic Development Partnership which 
developed a funding portal through its website 
Nvstedwithus.com.254 
 MedChain, Inc., a Delaware incorporated company located in 
Colorado, quickly became oversubscribed for its offering of a 
minimum of $10,000 of common stock with a SAFT to a 
maximum of $1.07 million.255  The company seeks to develop a 
 
249 Wellbeing Brewing Co., Offering Statement (Form C) (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1731872/000173187218000002/formc.pdf. 
250 Id. See also WELLBEING BREWING COMPANY, https://wellbeingbrewing.com/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
251 Wellbeing Brewing Co., Offering Statement, supra note 249. 
252 NVSTED, https://nvstedwithus.com/ (last visited March 7, 2019). 
253 Brian Feldt & Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership 




254 Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership Launching 




255 MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2019); see also MedChain, Offering Statement (Form C) (Oct. 7, 
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“community-driven solution” to the growing field of electronic 
medical records and electronic protected health information.256  
Although the company did not raise the maximum amount 
sought, after raising $466,896, MedChain closed the offering to 
additional investors.257 
 Another example of a successful offering is Farm from a Box, 
Inc.258  Farm from a Box, Inc. is a California benefit corporation, 
incorporated on February 6, 2012, with principal offices located 
in San Francisco.259  This company has developed an innovative, 
modularly designed farm system that provides tools and 
technology needed to support a two-acre off-grid farm.  The 
company manufactures and sells its farm system to consumers 
and large-scale buyers with the hope of connecting communities 
to healthy, sustainably grown food, and revolutionizing local food 
production.260  They initially set SAFEs261 with funding goals of a 
minimum amount of $25,000 and maximum amount of 
$535,000.262  However, they amended their offering amounts to 
$100,000 with a greater maximum of $999,999 in a later Form 
C/A filing.263  Although not their maximum target goal, the 
company ultimately raised $148,999 from 240 investors and 
 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1726640/000166516018000130/ 
xslC_X01/primary_doc.xml (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
256 MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
257 Id. 
258 Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2019). 
259 Farm from a Box, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (July 21, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/ 
FFABformC.pdf; see also FARM FROM A BOX, www.farmfromabox.com (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2019). 
260 FARM FROM A BOX, https://www.farmfromabox.com (last visited Mar. 7, 
2019); see also Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2019); Farm From a Box, Annual Report, (Form C-AR) (May 1, 2018), 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/FFABformC.pdf. 
261 The SAFEs were called Crowd Safe, an investment contract between 
investors and companies, wherein the investment is “in exchange for the chance to 
earn a return—in the form of equity in the company—if it’s acquired or has an IPO.” 
How the Crowd Safe Works, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/learn/investors/crowdsafe 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019). The Crowd Safe was developed by the Platform Republic. 
Id. 
262 Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2019). 
263 Farm from a Box, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (July 21, 
2016) (identifying an offering deadline of December 16, 2016). 
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concluded their first campaign in March 2018.264  As this 
company is a startup with a bold idea, they will continue to need 
capital, which suggests there is still risk for their initial 
investors.265 
 For companies that sought to form capital with digital 
tokens, there were two of note that leveraged the Reg. CF 
offering and continued to raise greater levels of capital.  Item 
Banc, Inc., is a tech company located and organized in South 
Carolina that is supporting basic human need products in five 
categories: food, building materials, basic clothing, paper 
products, and hygiene.266  On June 18, 2018 Item Banc offered 
$1.07 million under Reg. CF of IBE Tokens to the general 
public.267  This offering occurred after the company had filed a 
notice of exempt offering under Reg. D Rule 504.268  In August 
2018, after one extension request on the previous filings, Item 
Banc amended the earlier filings and filed a Form 1-A with Reg. 
A disclosures about its $20 million offering of IBE tokens.269  
EpigenCare, Inc., a digital biotech company, located and 
organized in New York, leveraged the initial Reg. CF filing 
immediately following a Reg. D Rule 506(c) offering.270  On March 
20, 2018, Epigen, Inc. filed both a Form C to offer $1.07 million of 
EPIC Tokens and a Form D to offer $20 million of the tokens.271  
In a later Form C-U filing, Epigen, Inc. reported that it did not 
meet its maximum goal of raising over $1 million under the Reg. 
CF.272  The company was able to raise over $36,700 under Reg. 
CF and continued to raise funds from accredited investors in the 
Reg. D filing.273 
 
264 Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2019). 
265 See Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 551–53 (discussing potential and risks of 
SAFE investments). 
266 See ITEM BANC, https://itembanc.nl/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
267 Item Banc, Offering Statement (Form C) (June 18, 2018).  
268 Item Banc, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (May 30, 2018). 
269 Item Banc, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (June 14, 2018).  
270 EpigenCare, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 20, 
2018). 
271 EpigenCare, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (Mar. 20, 2018). 
272 EpigenCare, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 20, 
2018). 
273 EpigenCare, Inc. (Form C, C/A, C-U and D/A), https://www.sec.gov/cgibin/bro 
wseedgar?CIK=1727821&owner=exclude&action=getcompany&Find=Search. 
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2. Coastal Dispersion and Preference 
 Other ways to measure the scope of investment 
crowdfunding include evaluating the geographical distribution of 
the company transactions; the choices of entity made by the 
companies; and offering characteristics.  Over the two-year 
period that this Article focused on, changes have occurred.  The 
most pronounced changes relate to a diffusion in intermediation, 
concentration of the offerings geographically, a preference toward 
incorporating or organizing LLCs in Delaware, and a normalizing 
of the types of securities offered. 
 The bulk of digital token offering financings  are mainly 
located on the west coast.  The geographic distribution, set forth 
in this study, illustrates the regional divide with respect to 
investment crowdfunding, and even more so, in digital token 
transactions, where offerings essentially are developing on the 
west coast.274  This coastal concentration in digital token 
offerings and funding portal dispersal nationwide appears to be 
similar to what Professor Magnuson called “diffusion” in the 
FinTech Markets.275  This dispersal illustrates pockets of digital 
token offerings concentrated within two to four  funding portals, 
but a wider variety of funding portals and offerings nationwide. 
 While this investment crowdfunding study did not look at 
incorporation or organizational documents, what is apparent 
from the Form C filings is that there is more concentration of 
companies selecting Delaware as the preferred choice of entity 
than in 2016.276  These choices of entity seem related to “the 
scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible charter and bylaw 
terms, and shareholder voting rights”—which Professor Lipton 
states “are controlled by the law of the state of incorporation, 
regardless of whether the corporation has any real economic ties 
to that location.”277  Empirical work on choice of entity has also 
“illuminate[d] how parties actually behave” and how the “parties 
 
274 See id. 
275 See Magnuson, supra note 171, at 163–65. 
276 More research would be needed to determine the reasons for this flight to 
Delaware. It could be a function of larger transactions, herd behavior, or other legal, 
business, and tax considerations. See id. at 178 (explaining reasons for herd 
behavior in FinTech markets: “This may occur in several different ways, but perhaps 
the simplest involves computer programs sharing certain programming templates. If 
an algorithm proves successful in the market, other actors may be tempted to simply 
copy or replicate the algorithm.”). 
277 Lipton, supra note 182, at 597. 
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would be likely to behave in response to legal rules.”278  Professor 
Chen’s study contradicted the fact that business corporations 
that heavily favored Delaware as the state of incorporation 
actually preferred New York for choice of law and forum in the 
context of merger agreements.279 
3. A Business Disruption? 
 “All business disruptions begin with business innovations.”280  
There are several reasons that investment crowdfunding may 
contribute to business disruption and innovation.  First, as CFTC 
Commissioner Quintenz claimed, digital tokens “hav[e] and will 
continue to have, an impact on title transfer and settlement 
processes,” or otherwise a “back office tokenization revolution.”281  
There is a belief that “digital assets are here to stay.”282  It will be 
just a matter of time before digital ledger technology will be able 
to verify entries between parties and scale to the proportion 
required for continuous use. 
 What is more unlikely is that smart contracts will alleviate 
the need for middle men and women, until there is a potential 
reduction in transaction costs and regulatory costs.283  Just 
recently, when the cost of Bitcoin dropped below the support level 
of $6,000, pundits argued that the market price for Bitcoin could 
drop to $0 because the mining transaction cost would be more 
than the potential investment.284  This suggests that beneath the 
blockchain layer, there are middle men, and without social or 




278 Chen et al., supra note 183, at 31–32. 
279 Id. at 3–4. “This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion reached in the 
Eisenberg and Miller study that, if a company is incorporated in Delaware, the 
company has a tendency to choose New York law." Id. at 6. 
280 Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From 
the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1571 (2017). 
281 See Brian Quintenz, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, Remarks at the Eurofi High Level Seminar (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11. 
282 See Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 83. 
283 See Biber et al., supra note 280, at 1572–73 (“Entrepreneurs seek to 
minimize their transaction costs and production costs by selecting the most efficient 
size and type of business organization.”); see also R. H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 397 (1937). 
284 Atuyla Sarin, Opinion: Bitcoin is Close To Becoming Worthless, 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bitcoin-is-close-
to-becoming-worthless-2018-12-03. 
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itself without drivers.  It is evident that theoretically, smart 
contracts can allow self-regulation without third party 
intervention.   
 Second, as Reg. CF offerings are growing, the need for a 
company to seek venture capital and angel investor funding may 
be replaced by this new mechanism for financing.285  Arguably, 
the manner in which investment crowdfunding may disrupt 
these markets depends on the continued success of Reg. CF.  
Commentators argue that there are several ways venture capital 
could be disrupted by investment crowdfunding: actual 
democratization of access to capital; the traditionally 
underfunded can become successfully funded by this new access 
to capital; and that there is a proliferation of companies that do 
not seek the same exit and end goals as venture capitalists.286 
 There has been no sizeable disruption in investment 
crowdfunding, digital tokens, or in capital formation as of this 
writing.  Again, the story of business disruption and innovation 
will take some time to determine if companies, the marketplace, 
investors, and the communities, are measurably changed because 
of the offering of the variety of securities under Reg. CF.  In the 
event that companies are able to create a fully viable digital 
token reliant on blockchain technology, that endeavor could be an 
innovative business disruption. 
 
FINDING D1: BUSINESS DISRUPTION IS LIKELY IF 
DIGITAL TOKENS RELIANT ON THE BLOCKCHAIN  
ARE REALIZED 
 
 There is one way that Reg. CF digital tokens are disrupting 
the investment marketplace and one way they are not.  One 
positive disruption is that these offerings can leverage other, 
future ICOs.  This development may provide potentially good 
disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on 
the success of blockchain technology. 
 On the other hand, there appears to be no disruption outside 
of the coastal areas and larger cities throughout the county.  For 
example, funding portals generally have some control over what 
offerings are hosted nationally.  The idea that a novel innovation 
in the state of Montana could find capital through and connect to 
 
285 See Marks, supra note 3, at 2. 
286 See id. at 3–6. 
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investors interested in this idea is unlikely.  Reg. CF financing is 
not yet democratizing capital and innovating in that manner.  
Second, there are a host of traditionally underfunded individuals, 
groups, neighborhoods, and companies that have yet to benefit 
from new blockchain-based technologies.  Unless there are better 
ways to connect the traditionally underfunded with funding 
portals and structures, that disruption has yet to evolve.  Third, 
currently, the data suggests that companies currently offering 
capital are still connected to the idea of exit strategies.  Most 
notable are the companies that are reliant on blockchain as a 
business strategy and the likelihood that the business concept 
will obtain further investment after the initial investment under 
Reg. CF.  Thus, Reg. CF is not yet disruptive in these positive 
ways. 
 What advocates of capital formation would not want is to 
have an adverse disruption occur.  To the extent that investors 
begin to invest in poorly conceived or speculative investments, 
this activity could have a negative effect on attracting new 
investors to these markets.  This could lead to effects similar to 
those witnessed during the housing mortgage crisis of 2008, 
where a large influx of participants in the market faced dire 
consequences when the market collapsed.  The concern is that 
investors not be put in a similar position as investors and 
purchasers in 2008.  The next Part provides some solutions to 
these troubling developments in digital tokens. 
III. LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE 
 Six hundred million dollars seems like a significant amount 
of financing.  However, that figure pales in comparison to ICOs, 
Reg. A, Reg. A+, Reg. D, 1933 Act IPOs, and other capital raising 
alternatives.  Although this research does not quantify the unmet 
business need for capital nationwide, the initial normative goals 
were to help entrepreneurs and to grow employment nationwide.  
At the same time, the idea that investors may lose their 
investments is not a positive tradeoff for capital formation and 
employment. 
 In light of the research, this Article provides 
recommendations for a path forward.  The first relates to actions 
that the SEC should consider immediately.  The second 
suggestion is for companies to consider.  The last provides 
suggestions for economic development organizations. 
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A. SEC Re-Evaluation of Reg. CF 
 The first recommendation is the most difficult to frame.  On 
the one hand, if the SEC regulates too much, then innovation in 
new types of securities and capital formation can die.  On the 
other, if the SEC regulates too late, then they are reacting to a 
worst-case scenario where investors have already lost their 
money and companies are potentially liable  The SEC must 
balance the time and manner in which it regulates.  That being 
the case, first, the SEC should re-evaluate whether Reg. CF will 
be able to attain the goals of job creation and capital formation, 
in light of the current status of investment crowdfunding and the 
ongoing sales of SAFTs and digital tokens.  Unfortunately, this 
solution will ripen only after the investment crowdfunding 
campaigns discussed in this Article have concluded and other 
metrics have concluded, such as the expiration of the blockchain 
development and a period of time to evaluate the sustainability 
of participating companies.  Potential evaluation time periods 
could be a first step after the offering period ends for all 
companies with offerings through June 30, 2018.  How much 
capital did these particular companies raise?  The second step 
would be to evaluate the success or failure of the companies that 
offered digital tokens reliant on blockchain development.  Did 
these companies accomplish their goal and did they provide 
investors with digital tokens?  The third step would be to 
evaluate the success of these companies after a minimum five-
year period to determine whether the companies are sustainable 
or facing financial difficulties, in the worst case, bankruptcy.  
These evaluation steps will provide great information for the 
SEC. 
 In the short term, the SEC should publish detailed guidance 
for unaccredited and unsophisticated investors.  Much of the 
SEC’s attention has been directed towards unregistered ICOs 
and IPOs with material misstatements sold to accredited 
investors.  As the proliferation of Reg. CF digital tokens 
continues and there is no certainty in blockchain technology, it is 
imperative that the SEC provide guidance directly to smaller 
investors intrigued by Reg. CF coin investments.  Current SEC 
guidance is helpful, but while the language typically references 
ICOs, it does not distinguish between the ICO market and Reg. 
CF transactions.  Shareholders might think that the warnings 
regarding ICOs do not apply to them.  However, as companies 
are getting their first batch of funding from small investors 
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before advancing to ICO markets and venture capital funding, it 
is important for the SEC and investment advisors to educate 
those small investors who may be taking the greatest investment 
risk.  More guidance may deter what happened when investors 
purchased synthetic collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”)287 or 
“mortgage-backed securities that lost value when the housing 
bubble burst.”288  In that advisory, the SEC must clarify its 
position on Reg. CF digital tokens for these investors. 
 Alternative financing options may be considered an ideal 
solution for the investors who will read the materials, but not so 
much for those who do not.  That being the case, there would be a 
greater chance that some investors would properly weigh the risk 
of loss to their own financial situation.  Better yet, if these 
investors had advisors, the advisor could assist them in better 
understanding the terms and conditions in which they plan to 
invest.  One cannot underestimate the level of potential loss in 
these offerings.   
B. Issuers Should Weigh Other Financing “Alternatives” 
 Companies, particularly those that are tipping into tokens, 
should thoughtfully consider alternatives to Reg. CF digital 
tokens.  There remains a level of speculation in these 
transactions, which could result in liability or greater risk than 
the alternative financings.  Companies should fully consider a 
backup plan in the event of an unsuccessful token asset offering, 
whatever the reason for the failure.289  Although investment 
crowdfunding shows signs of being an innovative bridge to 
capital, this Article notes some developments that raise 
uncertainties for companies and investors. 
 Some of the inferences are encouraging, and raising $600 
million is a good start.  However, other aspects of the scope of 
investment crowdfunding transactions, such as the escalation of 
digital assets in Reg. CF transactions, show some warning signs.  
Lawmakers, scholars, and industry representatives should 
continue to closely monitor this rapidly growing development to 
help foster a healthy, inclusive, and efficient expansion of 
company capital. 
 
287 Jennifer O'Hare, Synthetic CDOs, Conflicts of Interest, and Securities Fraud, 
48 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 678 (2014). 
288 Id.  
289 Reasons might include slow timing of the blockchain; the business concept 
does not evolve; or merely because digital token sales begin to flatten. 
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 Companies should carefully weigh “alternatives” to the coin 
alternative of raising capital.  To the extent that the company 
has no clue what a cryptocurrency or blockchain is, they should 
consider alternatives to this form of investment.  It is possible 
that developing a new digital asset to be traded on the blockchain 
is exactly what that company needs to grow its business.  That 
decision comes with due diligence and the right partners to help 
form the right strategies for the business. 
C. Economic Development Organizations Lead the Alternatives 
 Nvested is an excellent example of an economic development 
organization partnering with others to develop a funding portal 
to raise capital for companies in the state of Missouri.290  After a 
successful campaign to launch Wellbeing Brewing, LLC, the 
funding portal announced recently that it is available to launch 
other offerings for companies.291  To realize the goals of capital 
and job creation, economic development organizations would 
seemingly play a greater role in expanding opportunities for 
companies to connect with potential investors. 
 Dozens of states are not participating in Reg. CF offerings.  
The question as to why that is may be a function of other 
alternatives that are available to companies in non-participating 
states, but also may be a need for organizations to develop 
funding portals that are ready, willing, and able to assist with 
the launching of these offerings.  If it is not the will, what 
appears to be missing in states that are not participating is the 
way to participate.  That is where economic development 
organizations can play a significant role in this new method of 
capital formation. 
CONCLUSION 
 This research study provides a snapshot of investment 
crowdfunding’s broadening scope as a vehicle for capital 
formation. Part II discussed what success under Reg. CF would 
be.  It suggested that success would be: companies engaged; 
companies raising capital; and investors with a likely potential of 
a return on investment.  Using that success metric, the results 
 
290 Nvstedwithus.com is a website owned and operated by STL Critical 
Technologies JVI, LLC and is registered as a funding portal with both the SEC and 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). See also Felt & Barker, supra 
note 253; Barker, supra note 254. 
291 NVSTED, https://nvstedwithus.com/raise-funds (last visited on Feb. 22, 2019). 
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are mixed.  As  parts of the story are still unfolding, the final 
story of company/investor success or failure remains to be told.  
However, what we can glean from the study is that companies 
are engaged in capital campaigns using Reg. CF.  Some 
companies have been able to raise capital, while others continue 
to fail.  Investors, however, are seemingly at risk of losing their 
investments as the securities are developing and reliant on 
theoretical ideas.  Time will tell whether those who were the first 
to invest in blockchain-based digital tokens will be successful or 
not. 
 To recap, with respect to the types of securities offered, one 
can label this emergence as either troubling or a looming disaster 
that is waiting to happen.  The offering of blockchain-based 
tokens is novel, but selling these securities to unsophisticated 
and non-accredited investors is not ideal in the best case, and a 
travesty, in the worst case.  These concerns give traction to 
scholars who have expressed concerns about the type of securities 
that might be offered under Reg. CF.  When Reg. CF was 
adopted, digital tokens were not initially conceptualized at the 
time of the approval of the regulations.  The great uncertainty of 
these securities adds to the concern that startup companies will 
not succeed with their business goals and will not raise the boats 
of investors along with the communities they seek to serve.  
 However, there are encouraging developments in Reg. CF 
investment crowdfunding.  First, there is an expansion of a 
variety of securities markets for the crowd to invest in companies 
as they so choose.  There is an availability of an assortment of 
investments that allow the crowd to capitalize enterprises.  And 
more companies are able to avail themselves of a public access to 
capital with their first step towards “going public.”  In addition, 
funding portals are developing across the country and providing 
a technological solution for fundraising campaigns. 
 The investment crowdfunding phenomenon of securities 
digitally offered to the public has the potential to disrupt both 
the way companies capitalize their business and the manner in 
which funding portals and the crowd support these companies.292  
 
292 See WALES, supra note 17, at 218 (discussing global securities crowdfunding); 
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United 
States, has become a worldwide phenomenon, with New Zealand leading the 
charge.”); see also Zachary J. Robins & Timothy M. Joyce, How to Crowdfund and 
Not Fall Flat on Your Face: Best Practices for Investment Crowdfunding Offerings 
and the Data to Prove It, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1059, 1073–90 (2017) 
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As Reg. CF offerings are growing, the need for companies to seek 
venture capital and angel investor funding may be replaced by 
this new mechanism for financing to a degree.  Arguably, the 
manner and extent to which investment crowdfunding may 
disrupt these markets depends on the continued success of Reg. 
CF, blockchain technology, and the interest of investors. 
 It is argued that there are three ways venture capital could 
be disrupted by investment crowdfunding: actual 
democratization of access to capital; traditionally underfunded 
venture capital can become successfully funded by this new 
access to capital; and exit and end goals of companies diverge 
from venture capitalists.293  However, considering these three 
reasons the data does not reflect any sizeable disruption at this 
time.   
 A final concern is whether investment crowdfunding could be 
disruptive in a negative way.  To the extent that investors begin 
to invest in poorly conceived or speculative investments and lose 
their money, this activity could have a negative effect on future 
investors in the marketplace.  To ensure that investors do not 
revisit the devastation of the mortgage crisis of 2008, caution is 
the word of the day.  Still, the possibility of a future being 
recreated by the successful development of blockchain technology 
is not a bad dream to have. 
 
(including a review of selected data after the first anniversary year 2016 and 
recommendations on best practices for companies and lawmakers). The types of 
ventures seeking capital are quite diverse: health/fitness, technology, restaurants, 
liquor, gaming, cryptocurrencies, and movie production companies. Id. at 1076. 
293 See Marks, supra note 3, at 3–6. 
